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II. JURISDICTION 
This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court under Rule 
42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(k), Utah Code Annot. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant Hood's statement of issues on appeal (particularly 
statements 1 and 2) suggest errors based on assumptions which are 
foreign to the record. Appellee specifically objects to those 
statements as follows: 
1. Appellant's first proffered statement suggests that the 
trial court afforded Industrial Indemnity a presumption of reason-
ableness on the issue of its attorneys fees and costs and then 
challenges that presumption. Importantly, however, there is 
nothing in the record, including the Court's findings and 
conclusions, to suggest that any such presumption was afforded. 
There can thus be no basis to argue any error. The sole issue for 
review on the matter of the reasonableness of the fees and costs 
awarded against appellant Hood is whether or not there was "clear 
error" in the findings of fact supporting the Court's conclusions 
and the judgment awarded. 
2. Similarly, appellant's second proffered statement 
assumes that the trial court found redundancy and duplication in 
legal representation reflected in the fee award. That assumption 
actually runs contrary to express findings and conclusions. The 
issue again is strictly a factual one, addressing only whether or 
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not there was clear error in the Court's findings of fact 
supporting its conclusions that the fees incurred by Industrial 
were reasonable and necessary. 
3. Appellee has no objection to the appellant's formulation 
of the third issue proffered. 
IV. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Appellee believes that issues 1 and 2, as described by appellant 
ultimately relate to the trial court's findings of fact and are 
therefore subject only to the clear error/abuse of discretion 
standard under Rule 52(b), U.R.C.P. and Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 
1188, 1199 (Utah 1993). Issue 3, relating to the award of 
prejudgment interest as part of the reasonable fee award, involves 
mixed issues of law and fact. To the extent that this Court 
considers the trial court's rationale as based entirely on a legal 
entitlement, it is subject to review under a correction-of-error 
standard. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171, 
177 (Utah App. 1993). To the extent that the award of prejudgment 
interest is deemed a proper element of repayment of reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred and paid over a period of several years, 
the ruling and award is factual in nature and therefore subject to 
the deference afforded the trial court's factual findings under a 
clear error standard. 
V. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no determinative provisions applicable to this case. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This appeal offers a variation of the all-too-common 
circumstance of a contractor trying to avoid liability for the 
consequences of its deficient work. In this particular case, 
involving more than seven years of litigation over a breach of a 
large public works contract between Salt Lake City Corporation 
("SLCC") and James Constructors ("James")/ those consequences 
include a judgment against the contractor's corporate indemnitor, 
Hood Corporation ("Hood") awarding to the bond surety, Industrial 
Indemnity Company ("Industrial"), attorneys fees and costs incurred 
over the same general period and totalling $171,316.89 (including 
interest) [R.3476]. 
In making its ruling and entering its judgment and fee award in 
favor of Industrial, the trial court had the benefit of more than 
the evidentiary hearing Hood requested on Industrial Indemnity's 
fee request. It had been directly involved, from the bench, over 
most of the protracted dispute on the underlying contract and bond 
claims. In that light, a brief review of the case context, as 
reflected on the record, and completing and correcting appellant's 
cursory (and potentially misleading) offering1, is important to a 
proper understanding of the nature and justification for the award 
appellant now challenges. 
Appellant has neglected to support its factual statement with 
any citation to the record, as specifically required by Rule 
24(a)(7), U.R.A.P. 
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B. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings: 
On or about April 15, 1981, and in consideration of Industrial's 
issuance of certain performance and payment bonds for general 
contractor James Constructors, Inc. ("James"), a Hood subsidiary, 
Hood and B. M. Laulhere (an individual indemnitor, since deceased) 
executed a written indemnity agreement by which they agreed to 
indemnify and to hold Industrial harmless against losses, costs and 
expenses (including attorneys fees) incurred under or as a result 
of bonds issued. [A copy of the Contract of Indemnity, introduced 
at the hearing as Exhibit P-5, is attached hereto at App. D, A22-
26.] 
Industrial subsequently issued several bonds for James, 
including performance and payment bonds (each in the amount of 
$1,128,481) in connection with a contract between James and SLCC 
for a large underground water transmission pipeline. [April 1988 
Stipulation [Exh. P-12; also R.902-09, 910-18; (App. C) at 1 2.] 
In early 19 84, based on alleged breach of James' contract but 
without prior notice to Industrial, SLCC terminated James and relet 
the contract to correct significant deficiencies [R.3582]. When 
it learned of the termination and resulting dispute between SLCC 
and James, Industrial, through its local counsel, Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, undertook a substantial, good-faith investigation and 
analysis of the factual and legal issues involved in the dispute 
[R.3582-87; Exh. P-13 at 15] . The assessment of Snow, Christensen 
8c Martineau was that the case was a "nasty, dangerous" one, with 
significant exposure to the bond surety [R.3583]. The principal 
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players resisted a resolution, however, and, in separate actions 
consolidated in August, 1984 [R.63] James and SLCC each sued the 
other for breach of contract. In addition to naming James, SLCC's 
complaint leveled claims against Industrial, as surety on James' 
performance bond, and against Hood, as James' parent corporation, 
and sought recovery of more than $2 million in damages. 
With litigation commenced from both sides, Industrial tendered 
its defense in the matter to James and its counsel, under the 
indemnity agreement [R.3586]. James ultimately accepted the 
tender, but its local counsel, Reed Brown, requested the assistance 
of Industrial's counsel in formulating and pursuing defenses in the 
matter [R.3586]. Hood, on the other hand, represented separately 
by local counsel David Reeve, undertook to separate itself from the 
James/SLCC dispute by moving for (and at least initially obtaining) 
a summary judgment dismissing SLCC's claims against Hood [R.162-
163] .2 At the same time the court granted Hood's motion for 
dismissal, it also granted SLCC leave to amend its complaint 
against James to add claims of negligence. [Minute Entry of 
August 2, 1985, R.161].3 
2SLCC appealed Hood's dismissal and also attempted to amend its 
complaint to more clearly allege an "alter ego" theory against 
Hood. While SLCC ultimately prevailed on the appeal, the order 
reversing and remanding the case against Hood to the district court 
was not entered by the Court of Appeals until October 11, 1988 [R. 
1057-1065]. Hood and its counsel kept a very low profile in the 
trial court over the entire period of appeal. 
3SLCC's purpose in adding negligence claims was prompted by 
concerns over James apparent inability to respond to any judgment, 
coupled with Hood's possible dismissal and the monetary limitations 
of Industrial's bond, and was thus clearly designed to involve 
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On June 12, 1986, as a consequence of the new negligence claims 
and by means of a Reply to Salt Lake City's Amended Counterclaim, 
attorneys Elwood Powell and Jay Jensen entered their appearance on 
behalf of James, through its liability insurer, Cigna Insurance, 
and under a reservation of rights [R.180; R.3728]. While the scope 
of the insurer's defense eventually grew to encompass contract 
issues as well, Jensen's and Powell's initial representation of 
James was limited to SLCC's claims of negligence and related 
property damage [R.372 8]. 
On June 24, 1987, three years into the litigation, and while 
SLCC's appeal from the Hood dismissal was still pending, 
Industrial's counsel received a letter from Reed Brown, reversing 
Industrial's earlier tender and advising that he was withdrawing as 
Industrial's counsel. [Exhibit P-10; also at R.3606] Mr. Brown 
stated that he would remain as James counsel only for purposes of 
its counterclaim against SLCC; that attorneys Jensen and Powell 
would represent James on the property damage claims; and that 
Industrial Indemnity would have to handle the contract and bond 
issues on its own. [Id.] Consistent with and contemporaneous to 
that letter, Mr. Brown also filed a Notice of Withdrawal with the 
Court [R.369]. 
That highly unusual action, apparently prompted by Brown's own 
difficulties in obtaining payment for his services [R.3598], 
prompted Industrial's counsel to a more direct involvement in the 
James' liability insurer. [See SLCC's Motion to File an Amended 
Complaint, dated July 5, 1985, at 11 5-6, R. 131-33.] 
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litigation and a demand to Hood for security and assurances of 
protection against any ultimate bond losses and expenses. [Id.] 
On or about August 6, 19 87, Industrial's counsel forwarded a 
demand letter to Hood, outlining scheduled deadlines in the action 
(including a looming trial date) and demanded that Hood make 
satisfactory arrangements to undertake Industrial's defense and 
otherwise to comply with its indemnity obligations [Exhibit P-ll; 
also at R.3197-99]. Under the circumstances, Industrial also 
demanded that Hood post collateral sufficient to protect Industrial 
from any eventual loss or judgment on its bond exposure [Id.; see 
R.3599-3602] . 
Hood resisted Industrial's demand for collateral, but apparently 
patched up its disagreement with Brown, who thereafter inquired 
into a possible re-tender of Industrial's defense [R.3743-44]. 
Ill-at-ease over the prospects of having ultimately to deal with an 
insolvent corporate shell (James) and a parent company (Hood) 
fighting to exit rather than to resolve the litigation, Industrial 
again tied any re-tender of the case to the posting of collateral 
[R.3602]. When, by August 27, 1987, Hood failed to respond to 
Industrial's demand, Industrial's counsel entered a formal 
appearance in the action [R.381]. When Hood's cooperation was 
still not forthcoming by September 21, 1987, Industrial obtained 
leave to file an amended answer to the SLCC action, with a 
crossclaim and third-party complaint for indemnification against 
Hood and Laulhere [R.394]. On that basis, the Court also vacated 
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the then-existing scheduling order, continued the trial date and 
extended the discovery cutoff [R.419].4 
On April 4, 1988, after months of negotiation and positioning on 
the issue of Industrial's cross-claim, Hood and Industrial finally 
entered into a stipulation resolving the indemnity issues. Under 
terms of the stipulation [Exhibit P-12; also at R.902-909; App. C] , 
Industrial agreed to waive its demand for collateral in exchange 
for Hood's consent to judgment over in the amount of any judgment 
entered in favor of SLCC and against Industrial [Id. at 17]. The 
additional issue of Hood's obligations to hold Industrial harmless 
from attorneys fees incurred under its bonds was also specifically 
addressed and agreed to as follows: 
Industrial shall [also] be entitled to further 
judgment against Hood and Laulhere, jointly and 
severally, upon motion and supporting affida-
vit, for Industrial's costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred in this action or 
otherwise in connection with the described 
bonds . . . subject only to rights of Hood and 
Laulhere to request a hearing with respect to 
the reasonableness of the claimed costs and 
attorneys fees. All parties agree to be bound 
by the Court's determination of reasonableness. 
Id. at 18. 
Consistent with the Stipulation, Industrial conditionally waived 
its earlier demand for collateral, but continued to monitor Hood's 
financial status. While it also maintained its separate 
representation in the dispute with SLCC, Industrial agreed at that 
4SLCC's appeal from the order dismissing Hood from the action 
was still pending at the time. 
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time to minimize its direct involvement, leaving the "laboring oar" 
in the litigation to James' and its counsel (which, by then, was 
primarily that of its insurer).5 In fact, Industrial's attorneys 
did not thereafter attend any depositions and, aside from providing 
periodic assistance or consultation as requested by James' counsel, 
essentially limited its activities to monitoring the litigation, 
consulting with counsel, participating in occasional settlement 
discussions, and providing necessary reports and updates to 
Industrial [R.3608; Exh. P-l]. 
Industrial's reduced involvement and low profile, beginning in 
April 1988, in fact continued until approximately October, 1990, 
when the case once again entered an active pretrial stage, due in 
part to the appearance and involvement of attorney Robert Anderson, 
on behalf of James or Hood,6 replacing attorneys Brown and Reeve. 
By that time, neither Reed Brown nor David Reeve were actively 
involved in representing either Hood or James, and Mr. Anderson 
began coordinating with Mssrs. Powell and Jensen in preparation for 
5As Mr. Powell testified at the fee hearing, it was originally 
the insurer's intention to limit its defense to the negligence and 
property claims against James. However, the complexity of the case 
made it virtually impossible to separate those issues from the 
contractual issues involved, and the insurer's defense ultimately 
expanded to include issues relating to SLCC's contract claims 
against James, as well [R.3728]. Even after Hood later returned 
directly to the action on the reversal of the trial court's earlier 
summary judgment of dismissal, its own counsel played a minimal 
role in the litigation until late 1990. 
*Mr. Anderson formally entered his appearance on behalf of Hood 
in February, 1991, at which time Mr. Reeve withdrew. [R. 12 60] 
However, most pleadings filed thereafter designated Mr. Anderson as 
James' counsel, along with Mssrs. Jensen and Powell. 
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trial. It was at that time that James' counsel also once again 
solicited Industrial's direct involvement, in efforts to regain or 
reassert key surety defenses which Industrial believed had been 
earlier confused with similar defenses raised by James and which, 
with James' defenses, had fallen victims to an order in limine 
barring them as defenses against SLCC's claims [R.3710-3714]. At 
a meeting on or about October 23, 1990, Mssrs. Anderson, Powell and 
Jensen discussed a coordinated defense strategy with Industrial's 
counsel, David Slaughter. The conclusion by Hood's counsel was 
that the potential benefit to Hood of successful surety defenses 
justified renewed efforts to challenge the Court's earlier order in 
limine and to preserve defenses relating specifically to surety 
prejudice arising from the City's negligent inspection of the James 
contract.7 [Id.] Industrial's motion to that end was filed in 
early February, 1991 [R.1093] and resulted in Industrial's active 
involvement the case for that specific purpose. 
After the surety defenses were again rejected by the Court, and 
following further consultation between Mr. Anderson and Mr. 
Slaughter over the potential risks of creating a "deep-pocket" 
image by Industrial's separate representation at trial, Industrial 
consented to again tender its defense to Hood's counsel. [R.3715-
7If Hood could defeat SLCC's alter ego claims, its exposure was 
limited to that of an indemnitor to the surety. Thus, limitations 
to the surety's exposure as a result of SLCC's negligent project 
inspection would limit Hood's exposure to the same extent. 
Separate surety defenses concerning possible overpayments to James 
for work in place were surrendered as potentially counterproductive 
to the James/Hood defenses [R.3712-13]. 
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3720; Slaughter letter to Anderson, Exh. P-20, reproduced in the 
Addendum to Appellants' Brief at 76.] Finally, after more than 
seven years of starts and stops, appeals and changes of counsel for 
both Hood and James, Hood settled directly with SLCC before trial. 
On August 26, 1992, after settlement of the principal action and 
upon Hood's failure to respond to Industrial's invitation to 
address the issue of reimbursement of its attorneys fees, 
Industrial filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment and Award of 
Attorneys Fees Against Hood Corporation on Indemnity Agreement and 
Stipulation," seeking recovery from Hood under terms of the 
Stipulation [R.3153]. 
In bringing the fee matter before the court by a summary 
judgment motion, Industrial presented copies of detailed fee 
statements paid by Industrial [Exh. P-l]. Although it relied on 
the weight of legal authority affording a surety full 
indemnification against fees and expenses incurred, absent a 
demonstration of the surety's bad faith in the exercise of its 
discretion in deciding what legal expenses were in its best 
interests to incur, [August 6, 1992 Memorandum at 9-11, R.3164-
3166], Industrial also argued that its fees were reasonable in the 
context of relevant facts and factors, none of which were in 
dispute. [Id. at 11-15, R.3166-3170.] 
The trial court initially granted Industrial's motion on 
December 23, 1992 [R.3412]. However, on Hood's challenge and 
motion for a new trial, the court was persuaded to set aside its 
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summary ruling and, without objection from Industrial8, ordered an 
evidentiary hearing on the fee issue. During a one-day hearing on 
March 4, 1993, evidence was introduced, witnesses were examined and 
cross-examined and arguments were presented by both parties. The 
court also received all testimonial and documentary evidence 
offered by Hood's counsel. After making minor adjustments to the 
fees sought, to account for services rendered in connection with 
other than the SLCC dispute,9 the district court awarded judgment 
to Industrial in the amount of $171,316.89 (including the adjusted 
fee total, plus prejudgment interest)10 which, on its conclusion, 
and "in light of all the factors," was "reasonable, and was 
actually and necessarily incurred by Industrial in defense of this 
action." [Findings/Conclusions at 10, 1 29, R. 3474.] 
8In responding to Hood's motion for a rehearing, Industrial 
observed that, with Hood's demonstrated litigiousness, it was 
virtually certain that it would appeal almost any judgment or 
award. Thus, it suggested that, if the court believed, in its 
discretion, that an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of 
Industrial's fees would minimize the prospect of further 
proceedings and thus reduce the accrual of additional costs and 
fees to any significant degree, Industrial would have no objection 
to such a hearing [January 12, 1993 Memorandum at 2, R.3439]. 
9A1though the adjustments involved fees incurred in connection 
with claims on other bonds furnished for James and thus also within 
the scope of Hood's indemnity agreement [R.3680], Industrial has 
not raised any cross-appeal to the court's judgment. 
10Simple prejudgment interest was calculated from the date each 
fee payment from Industrial Indemnity was received by Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau [R.3708; Exhibit P-2]. 
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Hood raised no objection to the form of the Findings and 
Conclusions as entered, but, on April 28, 1993, noticed its appeal 
from the Judgment entered March 30, 1993. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Hood agreed to be bound by the district court's 
determination of the reasonableness of Industrial's fees, as 
supported by affidavit. Its attempts by this appeal to avoid that 
determination run contrary to the April 1988 Stipulation entered, 
which designated the trial court as the sole and final arbitrator 
of any disagreement over fee reasonableness. 
2. Contrary to Hood's arguments, the trial court did not 
rely on any "presumption" of reasonableness in awarding Industrial 
its fees. Although Industrial argued for that presumption in its 
initial motion for summary judgment and fee award, Hood balked at 
the motion and insisted on an evidentiary hearing, which the Court 
granted. Industrial did not argue any presumption at the hearing, 
but recognized and adequately satisfied its obligation to prove the 
reasonableness and necessity of its fees, in the context and under 
the facts of this case. The Court's ruling is supported on the 
record and the evidence presented at the hearing Hood requested. 
3. The record supports the conclusion that, with the 
exception of the period between James' rejection of Industrial's 
tender and the Stipulation reached with Hood, Industrial's counsel 
was involved only in monitoring the case, responding to discovery 
requests from plaintiff, participating in settlement discussions, 
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or filing motions and otherwise rendering assistance or expertise 
requested by James or Hood relating to Industrial's independent 
surety defenses and in support of general defense strategy. 
Despite Hood's attempts to downplay Industrial Indemnity's role and 
interest in the litigation, and the separate issues and defenses 
independent of the defenses upon which James relied, there was no 
finding by the Court of any duplication or redundancy in 
Industrial's representation and therefore no error, as a matter of 
law, in its ruling and judgment of reasonableness. 
4. There are multiple, legal justifications for the award 
of prejudgment interest in this case, distinguishable from other 
cases upon which appellant relies. Interest is easily calculated 
on fees actually paid by Industrial for Hood's account and 
therefore fully liquidated. In addition, prejudgment interest is 
an appropriate factor in the Court's determination of the 
reasonableness of the fees for which Hood is and has been 
responsible for an extended period. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
Hood's brief on appeal attempts to make of this case something 
different and more significant than it is. This appeal is 
essentially appellant's attempt to avoid the agreed mechanism for 
the resolution of limited issues relating to the enforcement of an 
indemnity agreement and to Industrial's rights to reimbursement of 
attorneys fees against a litigious, non-resident corporate 
indemnitor and co-defendant who, over a period of more than ten 
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years, has resisted reasonable settlement of every local dispute on 
which its surety was also exposed. 
The case is not what Hood describes, and Industrial's response 
to the contentions raised on Hood's appeal are distilled to three 
general areas: (1) Hood's entitlement to appeal the trial court's 
judgment; (2) the evidentiary and record support for the court's 
findings and conclusions, without the benefit of Hood's hypothe-
tical "presumption" of reasonableness; and (3) Industrial's 
entitlement to prejudgment interest on the fees actually paid as an 
additional measure or factor of reasonableness in the award. 
Against this outline, and under the circumstances of this case, 
Hood simply has no valid basis to challenge the trial court's 
findings and judgment. 
A. By Its Stipulation with Industrial, Hood Agreed to Abide 
by the Trial Court's Ruling of Reasonableness. 
As an initial point, Hood has no business before this Court. 
There has never been any question or dispute over Hood's contrac-
tual obligations, as an indemnitor and under clear terms of a 
written indemnity agreement, to hold Industrial harmless from the 
consequences of claims or lawsuits on bonds furnished for James 
Constructors. There has also been no question that Hood's 
indemnity obligation extends to Industrial's costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees. Both of those issues were resolved by Stipulation 
in this very lawsuit [Exh. P-12; also R.902-909]. Finally, there 
is no dispute that Industrial in fact incurred substantial fees and 
expenses as a result of claims on James bonds, including more than 
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seven years of the litigation between SLCC, James, Industrial and 
Hood. The only potential issue specifically reserved under terms 
of the Stipulation was the "reasonableness" of fees ultimately 
incurred and which Industrial would otherwise be entitled to reduce 
to judgment "on motion and affidavit." [Stipulation, Exh. P-12, at 
18; App. C at A17-18.] 
By their stipulation, Hood and Industrial agreed that, upon 
their own inability or failure to come to an agreement and 
settlement on the reasonableness of Industrial's fees, the matter 
would be directed to the district court for resolution, on any 
hearing Hood might request. [Stipulation, Exh. P-12 (App. C) at 
18.] In that same connection, however, both parties agreed "to be 
bound by the Court's determination of reasonableness." 
[Stipulation (App. C) at 1l0; R.906]. (Of course, given the nature 
and extent of the court's own first-hand experience with counsel in 
the context of the underlying dispute with SLCC, it made sense for 
the parties to agree to have the trial court decide the matter.) 
The clear purpose and effect of the April 1988 stipulation was 
to resolve as much of the indemnification issue as could be 
addressed at that time to enable a unified defense against SLCC's 
claims. [See Stipulation, Exh. P-12 (App. C) ^ 6.] Inherent in that 
arrangement, and particularly in the specific covenant of each to 
abide by the court's determination of reasonableness, was an 
agreement that the trial court would be the sole and final 
arbitrator of the fee issue. The parties thus effectively limited 
their rights to challenge the award on appeal. To permit Hood a 
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second-level challenge to the reasonableness ruling not only 
violates its agreement to be bound by the trial court's 
determination (whatever that was) but subjects this matter to the 
perpetual and repetitive adjudication which the Stipulation was 
specifically designed to avoid. 
Utah's Supreme Court has long observed "that the law of this 
state favors arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of 
resolving disputes." Utility Trailer Sales of Salt Lake, Inc. v. 
Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987). In the interest of 
preserving the policy and benefits of arbitration, the Court has 
also stated that "judicial review of arbitration awards should not 
be pervasive in scope or susceptible to repetitive adjudications; 
it should be strictly limited to the statutory grounds and 
procedures for review," Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 
844, 846 (Utah 1983), and that " [a]s a general rule, awards will 
not be disturbed . . . so long as the proceeding has been fair and 
honest and the substantial rights of the parties have been 
respected." Utility Trailer Sales, 740 P.2d at 1329 (Utah 1987). 
In turn, the statutory grounds for review, set forth in § 78-
31a-14(l), Utah Code Annot., are limited to circumstances of fraud 
or improper conduct by the arbitrator, which are not applicable to 
the present case. There is nothing in the statutes suggesting that 
the rules of review on appeal should be any different or broader in 
situations where the parties have agreed to be bound by the trial 
court's findings than in cases of binding arbitration outside the 
court. If the trial court is to be afforded great deference in its 
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factual findings in the traditional setting, there is reason to 
afford it even broader deference in situations, such as this one, 
where each of the parties has agreed to be bound by whatever 
determination the court makes. 
Through all its arguments, appellant has thus simply ignored 
that it has no business bringing this appeal in the first place. 
B. The Court's Ruling, Findings and Judgment Were Not Based 
On Any "Presumption" of Reasonableness Afforded to 
Industrial's Fees and Costs. 
Contrary to appellant's suggestions, this appeal has nothing to 
do with any "presumption of reasonableness" guiding the district 
court's findings and conclusions and its ultimate award of 
Industrial's fees and costs. Judgment was entered on findings of 
fact, following a day-long evidentiary hearing, at which Industrial 
offered evidence supporting the reasonableness and necessity of its 
fees and at which Hood had an opportunity to offer whatever it 
considered appropriate to challenge and rebut that evidence. In 
bringing its initial motion for summary judgment on the fee issue, 
Industrial admittedly argued in support of a presumption of 
reasonableness in favor of a surety's rights to repayment of fees 
and costs from indemnitors. In doing so, it relied on compelling 
precedent holding indemnitors seeking to avoid obligations for fees 
actually incurred to a burden of showing that the surety incurred 
the fees in "bad faith," requiring in turn a showing of dishonest 
purposes or improper motives in the surety's actions rEngbrock v. 
Federal Insurance Company, 370 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1967)], neither 
of which is at issue in this case. 
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In the end, however, Industrial did not press that theory or 
argue that entitlement during the evidentiary hearing. In fact, 
Industrial's counsel, Scott Daniels, specifically acknowledged 
Industrial's burden at the hearing, stating, "I suppose we 
[Industrial] have to prove that our fees are both reasonable and 
necessary." [R.3770] 
Ultimately, Hood's suggestion that the Court afforded Industrial 
a presumption of reasonableness is based solely on an unwarranted 
twist on a comment by Judge Young, quoted out of context: "So if it 
begins out as all being reasonable then the prong that I think that 
Mr. Anderson is claiming the right to prevail on is that it, in 
fact, wasn't necessary." [R.3782.] Hood suggests that it is 
"apparent" from that statement alone that the Court decided "to 
accord Industrial's attorneys' fees request a presumption of 
reasonableness." [Appellant's Brief at 9.] However, the full 
context of Judge Young's statement reveals how far-fetched Hood's 
argument is. 
Judge Young prefaced the remark by referring to the testimony of 
Craig Mariger, who, as Hood's own expert witness, had earlier 
testified as follows: 
I am not saying that their [Industrial's attorneys'] hourlys 
were too high, they are ultimately very reasonable. I'm not 
saying any particular task was unreasonable. What I'm saying 
is it was not necessary for them to interject themselves in 
the litigation and that those fees and costs were not 
necessarily incurred, therefore, not reasonable. 
[and] 
I'm saying they're unnecessary and therefore unreasonable . 
. . But I'm not saying they are unreasonable in terms of the 
amount of time that was spent or the dollars charged for the 
services performed. 
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[R.3766, 3771] 
Thus, aside from whether or not a surety is entitled to a 
presumption of reasonableness as a matter of law, it is clear that 
no such presumption guided either the evidentiary hearing or the 
Court's findings or conclusions in this case. Even on Hood's 
argument against such a presumption, there can be no error where no 
presumption was applied. Hood's argument to that end is a classic 
"red herring." 
C. The Court's Findings and Conclusions Are Supported on 
Adequate Evidence, Even Under the Most Restrictive of 
Approaches. 
Cases involving a surety's rights to recover under its indemnity 
agreement for legal fees and other expenses incurred in litigation 
on its bond reveal at least three categories of analysis. 
The most common approach, with a rich tradition in basic 
principles of common law, is simply to hold the parties to the 
terms of their contract. Under that rule, exemplified by U.S. 
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Hittle, 96 N.W. 782 (Iowa 1903), and 
adopted by many other courts,11 all expenses incurred by the surety 
are recoverable under the indemnity agreement, unless the principal 
has shown bad faith on the part of the surety. This approach 
nSee, e.g., Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Bloomfield, 401 F.2d 
357 (6th Cir. 1968); Kilaore v. Union Indemnity Co., 132 So. 901 
(Ala. 1931); J.D. Halstead Lumber Co. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co. . 298 P. 925 (Ariz. 1931); Indemnity Insurance Co. of 
North America v. McMillan, 153 S.W.2d 264 (Tex Civ. App. 1941). 
Similar cases likewise give literal interpretation to broad terms 
of indemnification contracts, without express reference to Hittle. 
E.g., Hennepin Public Water District v. Peterson Construction Co., 
270 N.W.2d 419 (111. App. 1971); Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. 
W.H. Myrick, 317 So.2d 632 (La. App. 1975). 
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recognizes that the surety has broad discretion to decide what 
legal expenses are in its best interests to incur. 
In stark contrast to Hittle is the holding of the Tennessee 
Court of Appeals in Central Towers Apartments, Inc. v. Martin, 453 
S.W.2d 789, 799 (Ct.App.Tenn. 1969)--a case upon which Hood relies 
in its brief. Central Towers modified the Hittle approach by 
looking beyond the written agreement to place greater weight on the 
facts and circumstances of the relationship between the principal 
and the surety in that case. The court was thus willing to look 
beyond the issue of the surety's good faith to probe both the 
reasonableness and necessity of the surety's action. To that end, 
the court's decision (which reversed the trial court's decision in 
favor of the surety) also offered a list of facts which it felt 
"will have a bearing on the reasonable necessity of action and good 
faith under the circumstances." 453 S.W.2d at 800. The list was 
intended as neither an exclusive nor exhaustive list of 
considerations, but was simply a means of providing some framework 
for essentially second-guessing the surety's decision. 
Somewhere between Hittle and Central Towers lies a third group 
of cases which have rejected the "necessity" test but which still 
require good faith by the surety and the exercise of reasonable 
discretion and due diligence on its behalf. See, e.g., Fidelity & 
Casualty Co. of New York v. Mauney, 116 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1938). 
Of these three approaches, that adopted by Central Towers is the 
only one which exposes the surety's decisions to subjective tests 
of reasonableness and necessity with the benefit of hindsight. As 
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such, and from at least the surety's standpoint, it is also the 
most restrictive of the various tests. Yet, as pointed out in 
Industrial's August 6, 1992 memorandum accompanying its Motion for 
Judgment and Award of Attorney's Fees on Stipulation [R.3156-3171], 
its entitlement to the fees ultimately awarded survives even the 
dissective Central Towers analysis. The court's award to 
Industrial is supported by the facts and circumstances of this 
case, sustained on the evidence, and ultimately reduced to and 
summarized in findings and conclusions. 
1. Industrial's Decision to Retain Separate Counsel Was 
Reasonable and Justified Under the Circumstances 
(Finding of Fact No. 14). 
Hood suggests (at page 19 of its Brief) that the evidence 
marshalled in support of the various subsidiary findings upon which 
Finding No. 14 is ultimately based is "legally insufficient to 
support the trial court's finding" that "Industrial Indemnity was 
justifiably concerned as to whether Hood would adequately protect 
the interests of Industrial . . . [and that, under the various 
circumstances] , it was not unreasonable for Industrial to determine 
that it was necessary to defend itself in the litigation to protect 
and preserve its interests." [R.3469] 
As reflected on Hood's marshalling of the evidence, several 
factors contributed to Finding No. 14: (1) James' insolvency, as 
bond principal [R.3580-81] ; (2) Hood's lack of attention to the 
litigation, despite its substantial exposure [R.3583-85, 3595]; (3) 
Hood's failure even to list the litigation and related $2 million 
exposure on its financial statements [R.3601-02, 3613-14, 3621-23]; 
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(4) Hood's reluctance to pay Reed Brown's attorneys fees, even over 
the period when Mr. Brown was representing both James and 
Industrial [R.3586-88, 3698]; (5) James' rejection of Industrial's 
tender of defense [R.3596-98]; (6) Hood's stubborn refusal to post 
collateral or to provide other adequate and acceptable security to 
Industrial [R. 3599-3602]; and (7) Hood's refusal to authorize or 
participate reasonably in settlement negotiations with SLCC over an 
extended period, despite great exposure to James under the contract 
and to Industrial under the bond [R.3583-85, 3691-94; 3698]. 
While Hood makes a modest attempt to challenge some of the 
subsidiary findings, including in Finding No. 14, its marshalling 
demonstrates that each is supported by adequate evidence. As a 
result (and despite its reliance on the Central Towers approach) 
Hood's ultimately relies on an argument that seems to suggest that 
the various circumstances of the relationship between Industrial 
and Hood over the course of this case are ultimately not as 
important as the fact that Hood was "financially able" to respond 
to any judgment that might enter against Industrial. [See 
Appellant Brief at 19-20.] Hood would thus have this Court hold 
that the only factor to which a court may properly look to gauge 
the reasonableness of the surety's independent involvement in a 
case is whether or not there is an ultimate "absence of risk to the 
surety as a practical matter." [Appellant's Brief at 19.] All 
others, including the several suggested under even the restrictive 
Central Towers analysis, are apparently of little importance. 
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This is not a single-factor case, however. While it is easy for 
Hood, at this stage, and after having ultimately settled with SLCC, 
to suggest that Industrial need not have been involved in the 
litigation as it was, the suggestion does more to beg the question 
than to answer it. The question of reasonableness is not properly 
a matter of hindsight analysis. It is properly viewed and judged 
from Industrial's position at the time. It was in that context 
that the fees were incurred and it was in that context that the 
trial court ruled. 
Thus, consistent with the deference afforded a judicial fact-
finder under the abuse-of-discretion standard, Baldwin v. Burton, 
850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993); Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1985), Hood's appeal must be properly limited to the question 
of whether there is at least a minimal evidentiary basis of facts 
and circumstances to support the court's findings that it was 
reasonable for Industrial to conclude that it was necessary to 
defend itself in the litigation (as it did) to protect and preserve 
its interests. There is clearly sufficient evidence relevant to 
at least the following circumstances: 
a. James' insolvency had a potential, detrimental 
impact on Industrial's position. 
Hood suggests that the Court abused its discretion by taking 
into account James' insolvency, thus overlooking Hood's status as 
a guarantor [Appellant's Brief at 20]. Yet, by even Hood's 
argument, James' financial status did not become "irrelevant" until 
after Hood executed the Stipulation with Industrial. [Id.] The 
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Stipulation was, in turn, a result of Industrial's direct 
involvement in the case, prompted by James' return of Industrial's 
original tender of defense.12 
Industrial's counsel, Dennis Norton, provided some perspective 
to the issue as follows: 
It wasn't just a matter of one lawsuit, the principal 
asking the surety to tender the defense so it could 
handle it and be economical. At the same time we, as 
Industrial Indemnity started getting claims from other 
subcontractors and materialmen, not only on this job but 
on several other jobs, and I had a total of twelve other 
claims that I had to investigate and discuss with Mr. 
Brown and make a decision as to what to do. And three of 
those cases were litigated through trial and James lost 
all three of 'em. And two of those three cases were 
appealed and the appeals were unsuccessful in each case. 
And so we were starting to build a track record at this 
point. 
[My] fear . . . , based on the experience that we had had 
for three full years was that James was going to lose the 
case and Hood would stay in Los Angeles and Industrial 
Indemnity would then have to pay the entire judgment and 
then go to Southern California to sue Hood and be in 
court down there for another 5 1/2 years before it got a 
trial date . . . . 
[R.3593-94, 3602] 
b. The primary responsibility for James' defense 
shifted from Reed Brown to James' insurer, whose 
representation, under a reservation, was initially 
limited and never fully co-extensive with 
Industrial's independent defenses. 
Hood's repeated suggestion, as if fact, that "the attorneys 
for Hood and James vigorously defended Industrial's interests in 
the Litigation" [e.g.. Appellant's Brief at 21] is simply contrary 
12Mr. Norton testified that he could not think of another time, 
in all of his experience when a principal had ever reversed the 
surety's tender of defense "except when the principal was getting 
ready to file bankruptcy." [R.3599] 
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to the evidence. While it is true that James' counsel, Reed Brown, 
accepted Industrial's tender of defense, he requested Industrial's 
continued assistance in that regard: As Mr. Norton testified, 
Mr. Brown objected to the tender. And so he and I then 
discussed the nature of his objection. And the nature of 
his objection was that it was a small office and a big, 
dangerous case and he requested our involvement in it. 
My personal involvement to assist him as he defended 
James. And so Mr. Brown and I worked together and he 
worked very hard in defending James through this period. 
[R. 3586] 
Furthermore, the vigor with which Mr. Brown pursued the joint 
defense was (understandably) tied to his ability to obtain payment, 
and problems in that regard prompted him to return the tender to 
Industrial three years into the litigation [R.3598]. Brown's role 
was eventually overshadowed by the representation afforded James by 
its insurer. Yet, there is no dispute that the insurer's 
representation of James did not extend to Industrial's defense as 
well. As Industrial's counsel, Max Wheeler, testified, 
[Mr. Powell, as insurer's counsel] was defending only a 
small portion of the claims that the City had made, and 
those claims had to do with property damage occurring as 
a result of the failure of the pipeline. And he was 
always in a quandary, as I recall, as to how far he 
should go, because the exposure of Cigna [the insurer] 
was just a small percentage of the total amount. And I 
recall Mr. Powell and I discussing that from time to time 
about his limited role, although, as it developed, he 
kind of became the lead lawyer because in defending a 
small claim it was necessary for him to defend a lot of 
the overall claims dealing with negligent installation of 
the pipeline and all of the rest of it. 
[R. 3695] 
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Under examination by Mr. Daniels at the hearing, Mr. Powell 
himself confirmed that the surety/insurer defenses were not 
coextensive: 
Q. And you were trying to cooperate with Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau lawyers in the defense of 
this; isn't that right? 
A. To the extent cooperation was possible, certainly. 
Q. To the extent that your clients didn't have 
conflicting interests; is that right? 
A. That is correct, 
Q. And they seemed to be doing the same? 
A. As far as I could tell. 
[R. 3733] 
Even with the appearance of successive counsel for either Hood 
or James over the course of the litigation, it was unclear to the 
very last who was actually represented and who was not, and to what 
extent the various parties had or might have had interests contrary 
to or potentially prejudicial to Industrial Indemnity's. 
c. Hood's primary goal seemed to be to avoid, not to 
actively participate in the lawsuit, leaving the 
matter to James and Industrial. 
Contrary to the picture Hood paints in its brief, there is no 
evidence that it made any direct effort to undertake Industrial's 
defense until the very final stages of the litigation, despite 
Industrial's repeated invitations and strong recommendations that 
Hood address some interest and attention to the dispute. In fact, 
from the commencement of the lawsuit in 1984 until late 1988, Hood 
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was fighting to obtain (and then to retain) dismissal of SLCC's 
direct claims against it. As Mr. Norton testified, 
I've been involved in nasty, dangerous cases before, but 
the difference here was that Hood Corporation seemed 
uninterested in what was happening out here and had let 
the defense of the case to James who, at that point, 
consisted of the President of James, a fellow named Jim 
Foreman, and his secretary. . . . But we knew, and James 
knew that James couldn't pay any Judgments and we tried 
to interest Hood Corporation in the case to come out, 
investigate, do some independent work to see what, to see 
what the exposure really was rather than relying on the 
guy who was in charge of the project. And we couldn't 
get that interest. 
[R. 3583-3584.] 
The court, from its own experience in the case, clearly 
agreed. When Hood's attorney, Mr. Anderson, made clear that he was 
not part of the case over a period to which the Court addressed 
some criticism, Judge Young responded as follows: 
I know. And the bad thing is that you weren't 
[in the case] and the bad thing is that you 
weren't in this case early on and that the 
case by Hood was just simply being ignored or 
neglected. It may go away. 
And I'll be really candid, the real errors in 
this case were made by Hood. They were the 
ones who didn't want to take an affirmative, 
assertive role here . . . . 
[R. 3795-96.] 
d. Hood refused to post collateral, despite clear 
exposure and Industrial's rights to demand it. 
Substantial net worth or not, Hood signed the indemnity 
agreement and agreed to its terms, including the potential 
requirement to post collateral. It was not unreasonable for 
Industrial to insist on that performance. Yet, 
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[Hood] objected to being named in the suit, objected to 
the demand for collateral. And it was my strong 
recommendation to my client that we obtain collateral if 
the company was as strong as it said it was, then it 
would be no problem for it to give us security interest 
in a piece of property. 
[R. 3600-01] 
At no time did Industrial agree that Hood's financial strength 
was security enough. In fact, Mr. Norton testified of "many, many, 
many experiences" of corporations in strong financial positions 
which were later unable to respond to claims for indemnity. [R. 
3677.] The Stipulation to which Hood ultimately agreed, entitling 
Industrial to a judgment against Hood in the amount of any eventual 
judgment against Industrial, plus a judgment for reasonable fees 
incurred, involved a compromise of Industrial's demand. Although 
short of the security to which it was entitled, the Stipulation did 
afford Industrial relief from the prospects of having to chase Hood 
in the California courts. By the same token, however, that interim 
resolution was also not tied to any surrender of Industrial's 
defenses or separate representation. Industrial essentially fell 
back into the earlier arrangement with Mr. Brown, where it was not 
actively and visibly involved in the litigation, except as and when 
such involvement was requested by counsel for James or Hood. 
e. Hood made no attempt, even after the Stipulation, to 
request that Industrial again tender its defense 
until late in the process. 
Neither Hood nor James made any effort in connection with the 
Stipulation or for some time thereafter to request that Industrial 
again tender its defense. In fact, despite Industrial's consent to 
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minimize its involvement from that point, Hood's interests and 
activities, through attorney David Reeve, remained focused on 
SLCC's then-pending appeal of Hood's dismissal - not on the details 
and merits of the underlying litigation. 
Even when Hood did become involved (at least prior to the 
final stages, under Robert Anderson's representation), it was 
through counsel who "never understood the case, never made any 
attempt to understand the case, and was never paid to make any 
attempt to understand the case." [R. 3593.] 
This point was not lost on the trial court: 
Judge Young: Let me ask you this, Mr. Norton. From 
the time when you earliest tendered the 
defense to Hood there would have been no 
reason that they could not have simply 
stepped forward, and since they were 
potentially on the line have taken over 
and retained their own counsel to do that 
which you were ultimately doing 
thereafter, isn't that correct? 
The Witness: Yes. They were -- the problem was that 
we had James being defended and Hood not 
coming forward in any capacity. And that 
raised my stress level and that of my 
client because Hood -- and then when Hood 
finally did come forward it was through 
David Reeve who was never involved enough 
in the case to keep track of it. 
[R. 3595] 
As noted above, James' defense at that time was being handled 
primarily by its insurer, which had no obligation or interest in 
extending its defense beyond James. Hood and James both seemed 
satisfied that Industrial was in the background and that its 
counsel was available to participate in a coordinated defense, as 
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appropriate. There was certainly never any suggestion by James' 
counsel that Industrial should not remain involved in that fashion 
[R.3733]. In fact, Hood did not again request Industrial's tender 
until 1991, after Industrial, with Hood's and James' blessing and 
encouragement, had made a final (albeit unsuccessful) effort to 
preserve separate surety defenses which had earlier been barred but 
which, if successful, would have inured to Hood's benefit [R.3710-
3714, 3779]. 
While the foregoing does not address every circumstance which 
distinguishes this case from the cases upon which Hood relies, even 
this brief rehearsal of evidence makes clear that the circumstances 
guiding Industrial's decisions involved more than the apparent 
financial strength of a non-resident parent corporation who may or 
may not have had any direct involvement in the case had the 
original order of dismissal against it been sustained and had 
Industrial not brought the cross-claim against it for 
indemnification. There is certainly no basis in fairness for 
challenging, as an abuse of discretion, the court's findings on the 
reasonableness of Industrial's decision to proceed as it did. 
2• Industrial's Fees Were Reasonable and Necessary (Finding 
No. 25). 
Hood challenges the evidentiary base for the Court's Finding 
of Fact No. 25 that the fees incurred on behalf of Industrial were 
both reasonable and necessary in light of various factors. To an 
extent, its arguments against Finding No. 25 dovetail those made 
against Finding No. 14, and thus fail for the same reasons. It is 
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interesting, however, that its fee challenge appears to be much 
broader on appeal than it was at the hearing. 
a. The fees incurred were "reasonable and necessary" in 
the context of the governing circumstances. 
As noted above, testimony by Industrial's counsel as to the 
circumstances of Industrial's involvement and of the justification 
for its mostly low-profile but separate representation under those 
circumstances was largely unchallenged by Hood at the hearing. 
Instead, Hood focused on theories of "necessity" and "duplication" 
in an effort to trivialize Industrial's even limited activity over 
seven years of litigation in light of Hood's "undisputed" solvency. 
Nowhere is this more clear than on the testimony of Hood's own 
expert, Craig Mariger [R 3735-3781]. 
Mr. Mariger's analysis of Industrial's involvement and the 
fees charged in fact provide a rational framework, not only for 
Hood's analysis of Industrial's involvement, but for a focused 
consideration of various time-related factors bearing on the 
reasonableness issue before the Court. Mr. Mariger's testimony and 
related analysis focused on separate time periods of Industrial's 
involvement between 1984 and 1992: 
The first period of Industrial's involvement began in early 
May, 1984, when Industrial learned of SLCC's claim and of the 
threatened action against both James and Industrial under the 
bonds. Mr. Mariger did not raise any issue with the fees incurred 
over this initial period, involving as it did Industrial's 
independent investigations and assessment [R.3753]. In fact, he 
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concluded that it was entirely consistent with what a surety would 
be expected to do to avoid potential bad faith liability [id.]. 
Similarly, Mr. Mariger did not question Industrial's fees or 
activities during the period following James' acceptance of the 
surety's tender of defense in August 19 84 and prior to James' 
subsequent (and "unusual") rejection of that tender in June 1987 
[R. 3753-54]. 
Mr. Mariger also found no issue with the fees incurred between 
June 24, 1987 and at least August 25, 1987 - a period beginning 
with Reed Brown's rejection of Industrial's tender of defense 
(three years into the litigation) and ending with James' one-time 
request to renew and regain Industrial's initial tender. As Mr. 
Mariger acknowledged, "It's very unusual for a principal to re-
tender back a case and I didn't see anything unusual in the 
activities during that period of time." [R.3754.] 
With no real objection to the fees incurred over the first two 
periods, Hood's challenge ultimately focuses on a period between 
August 27, 1987, when Mr. Brown requested that Industrial consider 
re-tendering to James the rejected tender of defense, and April 27, 
1988, when Hood and Industrial Indemnity entered the Stipulation 
resolving Industrial's indemnity claims under its cross-claim and 
third-party action [R.3754]. Mr. Mariger opined that, given Hood's 
strong financial position (and apparently despite Industrial's 
difficulties in soliciting Hood's attention and active involvement 
in the dispute) it was "unreasonable" for Industrial to enter a 
separate answer on behalf of the surety and to insist on collateral 
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as a condition to returning the tender earlier rejected by James 
[R.3754-55]. 
Hood extends that position also to criticize Industrial's 
limited involvement after the Stipulation was signed and through 
the end of that year [R.3755], as well as its final period of 
activity, beginning in early January 1991 [R.3756],13 relating to 
what Mr. Mariger described as efforts "to reverse the court's order 
that was entered several years earlier . . .." [R.3756] However, 
Mr. Mariger admitted to having drawn his conclusion on a review of 
less than the entire record [R.3737] . He also admitted that he had 
never encountered a case where such a tender was later rejected by 
the contractor, and considered such action "very unusual." [R.3769] 
He further acknowledged that his analysis would have been different 
had he known that counsel for James and Hood had requested the 
assistance and expertise of Industrial's counsel in the matter: 
"Well, if he asks for assistance then I would have a hard time 
saying it was unreasonable for them to interject themselves in 
litigation." [R.3777] 
As Mr. Mariger described his own conclusion, "the primary 
basis of my opinion is that Industrial Indemnity should not have 
asserted itself in the litigation in August of '87." Hood was 
clearly entitled to offer that opinion in support of its argument. 
But the Court was just as entitled to reject it, which it clearly 
did. 
13Mr. Mariger again raised no issue over the fees incurred 
between January 19 89 through January 1, 1991 [R. 3755-56]. 
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b. The court found no "duplicative and unnecessary 
legal representation." 
As an alternative to its "abuse of discretion" arguments, Hood 
also suggests that the court erred in awarding fees for "redundant 
and duplicative work." [Appellant's Brief at 30.] In fact, 
however, the court found no such duplication, and Hood's suggestion 
that the court drew an erroneous "legal conclusion that redundant 
and duplicative legal services can be reasonable and necessary" is 
a pure contrivance, fully unfounded on the record. To the 
contrary, and as outlined above, the court's findings properly 
considered the circumstances of the case and supported a valid 
legal conclusion that the fees and costs paid by Industrial were 
both reasonable and necessary, based on those circumstances. 
Hood's argument of duplicative work simply puts an alternative 
twist on its earlier argument that there was no good reason for 
Industrial to have entered the litigation as it did. However, 
rather than focusing on its own financial condition, Hood focuses 
the "duplication" argument on Industrial's efforts to raise and 
maintain its surety defenses and attendance by Industrial's counsel 
at a limited number of depositions without asking questions.14 
However, the court's findings obviously found justification in the 
evidence presented for each challenged category of activity: 
14Hood also points to the fees incurred in monitoring and 
reporting to Industrial, even during periods of less than active 
involvement. Interestingly, however, its own expert witness found 
no issue with those activities, "which you would expect any surety 
counsel to be doing to their client." [R. 3752-53.] 
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1) Industrial's motion practice was justified and 
requested. The record more than adequately deals with issues 
concerning Industrial's pursuit of its inspection-related defenses, 
independent of similar defenses raised by James. Mr. Norton 
testified that 
We [Industrial] felt like the general 
contractor was not in a great position to 
argue negligent inspection because the 
contractor had the obligation to do the work 
in the first place, but the surety had a right 
to rely on the City and if the City inspected 
it negligently, but the surety ought to be 
able to rely on that. 
[R. 3591] 
Hood's own witnesses acknowledged that the interests involved 
in defending the claims against James were not exactly coextensive 
with the interests of the surety [R. 3780-81] and that Industrial's 
independent defenses, specifically those relating to negligent 
project inspection, would have directly benefitted Hood if SLCC 
failed at trial to establish its alter ego theory [R. 3779]. 
And while Hood takes particular exception in its brief to 
Industrial's efforts to "assert the same legal defenses and 
theories" that James and Hood had asserted, and in "unsuccessfully 
attempting to preserve its separate affirmative defenses," it fails 
to mention the uncontroverted testimony of Mssrs. Norton, Wheeler 
and Slaughter (on behalf of Industrial) and Mr. Powell (on behalf 
of James) that, as part of his "vigorous defense," James' counsel 
requested the assistance of Industrial's counsel [R.3586, 3588], 
and that the defendants' strategy was to cooperate and support each 
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other's efforts, "to the extent cooperation was possible" [R.3733]. 
Hood also fails to mention that even Industrial's renewed attempt 
in 1991 to preserve and assert its affirmative defenses relating to 
negligent inspection was the result of a decision jointly made with 
counsel for James and Hood [R.3710-14]. 
2) Deposition time was limited and coordinated with 
James' counsel. The "issue" over Industrial's involvement in 
depositions, limited to the time between James' rejection of 
Industrial's tender and the date of the Hood/Industrial 
Stipulation, is similarly resolved on the record. As Max Wheeler 
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau testified, he and Mr. Powell 
coordinated the questioning of all deponents over that period: 
The idea was that we were cooperating with them in every 
way we could. I was certainly not interested in saying 
anything that would undermine anything they did, and in 
terms of what was going to be brought out through Mr. 
Powell. And I knew what that was going to be before the 
deposition. And he did it. And there was no reason for 
me to ask questions in some of those depositions. 
[R.3697] 
And as to the "necessity" of even that level of involvement, Mr. 
Wheeler testified, 
I think it would have been malpractice not to attend 
those depositions. We had, to some degree, an 
adversarial relationship with everybody else and if 
something had come out at those depositions adverse to 
Industrial Indemnity the other parties might have agreed 
to something on the record or convinced a witness to say 
something without any cross-examination that could have 
jeopardized Industrial's position. And we had to be 
there to make sure that didn't happen. 
[R 3697] 
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At no time prior to Industrial's efforts actually to obtain 
reimbursement of its fees did Hood or its counsel raise any 
objection to Industrial Indemnity's continued independent 
involvement in the litigation. In fact, as Mr. Wheeler observed, 
"I had strong feelings that they appreciated our involvement." [R. 
3698-99.] Similarly, Hood raised no issue with its obligation for 
fees thus incurred, until it came time to pay. 
D. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS PROPERLY FACTORED INTO THE TOTAL 
FEE AWARD: 
The court's award of prejudgment interest as part of the fees 
awarded to Industrial was justified on at least two separate bases: 
1. Prejudgment Interest Is Calculable on Fees Paid, as Paid. 
Hood's brief on appeal, as with its argument to the trial 
court, challenges Industrial's entitlement to prejudgment interest 
on fees expended as a part of the total fee award. As the trial 
court recognized, however, this case is very different from the 
types of cases, including contingent fee arrangements, relied upon 
by Hood in its arguments at trial. It differs in at least two 
important respects: 
First, Hood's fee obligation to Industrial Indemnity arises 
under Hood's contractual undertaking to indemnify Industrial and 
hold it harmless from losses, costs and expenses incurred under or 
as a result of bonds furnished for bond principal James 
Constructors, a Hood subsidiary. It is not a question of a fee 
award to a prevailing party in a lawsuit, as in the many cases upon 
which Hood relies in its brief. It is a question of reimbursing 
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costs incurred by Industrial Indemnity which it would not have 
suffered in the first place, but for (1) the litigation arising as 
a result of James' failure to perform as required under its bonded 
contract with SLCC, and (2) failure by both James and Hood to abide 
by their continuing undertaking to hold Industrial harmless from 
the results of that litigation, including fees and costs. Thus, as 
a distinction from all of the cases upon which Hood relies, each 
reasonable fee dollar expended by Industrial was expended for 
Hood's account, and was, in a very real ana practical sense, a cash 
advance to Hood under the indemnity agreement. Under those 
circumstances, and consistent with § 15-1-1, Utah Code Annot., Hood 
is also responsible for the statutory rate of interest on each fee 
advance, as applicable to any "loan or forbearance of money." 
The second distinction is closely tied to the first. Unlike 
Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Homeowners' Ass'n, 
789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990), Industrial's entitlement to 
prejudgment interest is not based on a contingent fee arrangement. 
It is based instead on unrebutted evidence at trial establishing 
fee payments which were liquidated and certain in amount as of the 
dates paid. [Findings/Conclusions at 10, 1 27.] There was no 
guesswork or estimation in the total of the fees incurred, nor, as 
a result, in the interest calculation on those fees. It was (and 
remains) readily calculable on each payment and is awardable on 
that basis. 
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2. Alternatively, Interest Is Another Factor in the Court's 
Determination of a "Reasonable Fee" Due Industrial. 
A third factor relates more to public policy. Under Hood's 
argument, any indemnitor may effectively avoid answering to a 
surety (or other indemnitee) for interest, as the only measure of 
the time value of payments made on its behalf or for its account, 
simply by challenging the "reasonableness" of those advances. 
Obligations for even a fully-reasonable fee, incurred over an 
extended period, such as this one, may thus effectively be 
discounted, and full indemnification thus abrogated, on a simple 
challenge. The result runs contrary, not only to justice and 
equity, but to the policy behind the statutory interest provisions, 
recognizing that there is a value to a contractual, monetary 
obligation which can be properly addressed only by an award of 
prejudgment interest, as an element or factor in a party's damages 
or in the overall determination of a reasonable fee. 
Although not specific to the issue of attorneys fees, the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. 
v. C & A Development Co., 777 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989) acknowledged a 
similar justification in reversing the district court's reduction 
of an arbitrator's award of 15% interest on sums past due from an 
owner to a contractor. Despite that the interest award was in 
excess of the statutory rate, the Supreme Court sustained the 
interest award was actually part of the overall compensation for 
damages. [Id. at 478; see also, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Makahuena 
Corp., 675 P.2d 760, 767 (Haw. 1983).] 
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While the present case does not involve precisely the same 
issue of "damages" inherent in Worthington, it lends itself to an 
equivalent analysis, even within the framework of the court's role 
of "determining" a reasonable fee. In the specific context of 
Hood's arguments against prejudgment interest, Mr. Anderson 
correctly described the Court's role as follows: 
And the very stipulation here, your honor, provides that 
you're going to determine what's reasonable after looking 
at everything and considering the continuum of the fact 
that services have been provided over this period and 
it's not a lock step thing. 
[R. 3793.] 
The court responded in that same context, and in a fashion 
entirely consistent with Mr. Anderson's charge: 
I already have the feeling that I'm not going to deal 
with this as though they [Industrial] have to be locked 
into a fixed fee from representing somebody in 19 82 to 
1993 where they have no payment. 
[R. 3799.] 
Thus, however designated, the prejudgment interest factor 
allowed to Industrial is simply a part of "everything" to which the 
Court looked in determining "what's reasonable." There is no abuse 
of discretion or error of law in that approach. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Stripped of the unfounded and unjustifiable overstatements of 
the case, and of issues that are not raised by or even relevant to 
an appropriate analysis, Hood's Brief reveals no specific challenge 
to any of these factual findings, other than the ultimate 
conclusion of reasonableness. 
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Against the highly-deferential "abuse of discretion" standard 
applicable to findings of fact, there is no significant issue 
justifying any challenge to the trial court's exercise of its fact-
finding powers in resolving the issue of reasonableness as 
anticipated by the governing Stipulation. The trial court's 
judgment should stand and this appeal should be dismissed. 
DATED this 3^ daY o f January, 1994. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Scott Daniels 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Industrial Indemnity Company 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, 
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On March 4, 1993, a hearing was held to determine 
reasonableness of attorney's fees incurred by Industrial Indemnity 
Company in the above-entitled matter, and the liability of Hood 
Corporation to pay those fees, Judge David S. Young presiding. 
Industrial Indemnity Company was represented by its attorney, Scott 
Daniels. Hood Corporation was represented by its attorney, Robert 
M. Anderson. Witnesses were sworn and called, exhibits were 
admitted and the attorneys were allowed to present argument. The 
Court being fully informed in the premises, now hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 15, 1981, Industrial Indemnity Company entered 
into an Indemnity Agreement with W.C. James, Inc., Hood 
Corporation, B.M. Laulhere, W.C. James, and Barbara M. James, 
whereby these parties agreed to indemnify Industrial Indemnity for 
any losses, damages, costs, or counsel fees which Industrial 
Indemnity may sustain as a result of surety bonds written on behalf 
of W.C. James, Inc. (now known as James Constructors, Inc.). 
2. On July 8, 1983, James Constructors (hereinafter "James") 
entered into a contract with Salt Lake City Corporation for the 
construction of a project described as Big Cottonwood Extension 
Terminal/Park Transmission Pipeline. 
3. As part of the project contract, Salt Lake City required 
that James furnish contractor performance and payment bonds, which 
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Industrial Indemnity consequently issued, as surety for James, in 
the amount of $1,128,481.00. 
4. In the Spring of 1984, Salt Lake City Corporation 
declared James in default on the project. 
5. On June 28, 1984, Salt Lake City Corporation filed suit 
against James, Industrial, and Hood, claiming that the work done 
by James was defective. 
6. When Industrial was put on notice of Salt Lake City's 
claim, it retained the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau to 
investigate the claim and to represent and protect Industrial's 
interest in the litigation, if litigation should arise. Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau was also charged to investigate and defend, 
or to arrange proper defense to, claims or lawsuits by unpaid 
suppliers and subcontractors furnishing labor or material to James 
for the Salt Lake City project. Snow, Christensen & Martineau had 
represented Industrial previously in connection with another claim 
brought against James. 
7. In the Spring and Summer of 1984, A. Dennis Norton, an 
attorney with the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau conducted 
a good-faith investigation of the failed pipeline on behalf of the 
surety. 
8. After Salt Lake City filed suit and after Norton's 
original investigation, Norton tendered Industrial's defense to 
James, through its attorney, C. Reed Brown. 
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9. After James' acceptance of Industrial Indemnity's tender 
of defense, and prior to early 1987, Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau's involvement in the Salt Lake City litigation was 
generally limited to monitoring the case, meeting periodically with 
Mr. Brown, and providing research and other assistance to Mr. 
Brown, at Mr. Brown's request or as otherwise needed as part of 
preparation of trial in the matter. 
10. On or about June 24, 1987, C. Reed Brown withdrew as 
Industrial Indemnity's counsel in this action under the prior 
tender of defense and tendered back the Industrial Indemnity 
defense to Snow, Christensen & Martineau. At that time, Mr. Brown 
told Norton that his withdrawal was prompted by James' likely 
insolvency, and an inability to come to agreement with James' 
parent company, Hood Corporation, concerning payment of 
considerable outstanding legal fees owed to Mr. Brown. 
11. On August 6, 1987, Norton sent a demand letter to Hood 
Corporation demanding that Hood make satisfactory arrangements to 
defend Industrial and to post collateral sufficient to protect 
Industrial from any eventual loss or judgment. 
12. Industrial was entitled to demand collateral under its 
indemnity agreement. 
13. On or about August 25, 1987, Mr. Brown wrote to Norton 
and requested that Industrial re-tender its defense. Norton 
informed Mr. Brown at that time that Industrial intended to defend 
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itself and to level a cross claim against Hood and to join B.M. 
Laulhere as a third-party defendant, unless collateral was posted 
as demanded. 
14. Although Hood had provided a financial statement showing 
it had a large net worth, Industrial Indemnity was justifiably 
concerned as to whether Hood would adequately protect the interests 
of Industrial. These concerns were based upon the fact that James, 
the bond principal, was without assets; that Hood had paid very 
little attention to the Salt Lake City litigation even though its 
exposure aDproached three million dollars; that Hood did not list 
this very significant and dangerous litigation in its financial 
statement; that Hood had been reluctant to pay Mr. Brown's 
attorney's fees, even though Mr. Brown had vigorously defended 
james and had also accepted tender of the Industrial defense; that 
the defense of Industrial Indemnity had been tendered back to 
Industrial; Hood's stubborn refusal to post collateral or to 
provide other adequate and acceptable security to Industrial; and 
Hood's refusal to authorize or participate in settlement 
negotiations with Salt Lake City Corporation, even though massive 
failures had occurred in the pipeline project and the City had 
removed and re-laid virtually the entire pipeline. Under these 
circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Industrial to determine 
that it was necessary to defend itself in the litigation to protect 
and preserve its interests. 
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15. On April 4, 1988, Industrial and Hood entered into a 
Stipulation resolving the indemnity claims raised on Industrial's 
cross-claim and third-party complaint against Hood and Laulhere. 
Under the terms of the Stipulation, Industrial agreed not to 
require Hood and Laulhere to post collateral. In exchange, Hood 
and Laulhere agreed that Industrial could have judgment over 
against Hood in the event Salt Lake City obtained judgment against 
Industrial, and that Industrial would also be entitled to judgment 
against Hood for Industrial's costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred jn this action or otherwise in connection with bonds 
furnished for James, subject only to the right of Hood to submit 
the question of reasonableness of those fees and costs to the Court 
for determination. 
16. Following April 1988, Industrial Indemnity continued to 
be represented by its separate counsel, but agreed to permit Hood 
and James to take the lead in the continuing litigation with Salt 
Lake City, providing support and assistance, as appropriate, and 
as generally consistent with the defendants' collective defense 
strategy. 
17. The firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau thereafter 
limited its participation in the case until October of 1990, when 
it was agreed among counsel for Hood, James and Industrial that 
Industrial would attempt to re-assert its independent defenses to 
the suit. Counsel for defendants determined that if Industrial 
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Indemnity were successful in that effort, the success would inure 
to the benefit of the indemnitors, including Hood, For a brief 
period of time following this October 1990 agreement, and as part 
of a pretrial effort to define and preserve issues for trial, Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau was involved in the case in asserting these 
defenses. The decision to more heavily involve Industrial and its 
counsel in the case was reasonable under the circumstances and was 
agreed to by James and Hood. 
18. All of the legal fees and costs for services rendered for 
Industrial Indemnity Company and related to the James file were 
recorded on daily time records and were in turn combined with 
separate cost accounting records relating to costs advanced on 
behalf of Industrial Indemnity to create itemized statements. 
19. The itemization of services and costs contained on these 
statements accurately reflect services actually rendered and costs 
actually advanced between December 23, 1982 and April 7, 1992. 
Fees over that period of time totaled $104,858.11 and costs totaled 
$5,099.50. 
20. Some of the fees and costs recorded in those statements 
do not relate specifically to the Salt Lake City matter and should 
be deducted from the total. These fees and costs amount to 
$5,148.t)0. 
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21. Industrial Indemnity paid all of the amounts billed on 
these statements shortly after the time that the statements were 
each sent. 
22. The fees charged to and paid by Industrial Indemnity were 
based on time spent, calculated at hourly rates for the attorneys 
involved. These services were rendered primarily by A. Dennis 
Norton, David W. Slaughter and Max D. Wheeler. The hourly rates 
for these attorneys over the period of their involvement are set 
out below: 
A. DENNIS NORTON 
1983 $ 100.00 
1984 110.00 
1985 120.00 
1986 130.00 
1987 135.00 
1988 140.00 
1989 145.00 
1990 150.00 
1991 155.00 
1992 160.00 
MAX D. WHEELER 
1983 $ n/a 
1984 n/a 
1985 n/a 
1986 n/a 
1987 120.00 
1988 125.00 
1989 130.00 
1990 135.00 
1991 n/a 
1992 n/a 
DAVID W. SLAUGHTER 
1983 $ n/a 
1984 n/a 
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1985 85.00 
1986 95.00 
1987 105.00 
1988 110.00 
1989 115.00 
1990 125.00 
1991 130.00 
1992 135.00 
23. In addition to the amounts set forth on these bills, 
Industrial Indemnity has incurred further expenses in preparation 
for the hearing on attorney's fees. These include the legal 
efforts and testimony by three attorneys listed above and in 
addition, the services of Scott Daniels, whose hourly rate is 
$135.00. A reasonable attorneys fee in preparing for this hearing 
is $5,220.00. 
24. All of the hourly rates charged by the attorneys for 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau are reasonable, considering the 
experience of the attorney involved and the complexity of the 
matter. 
25. The fees and costs expended by Industrial, as set forth 
in the statements of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, were both 
reasonable and necessary, considering the complexity of the matter, 
the reasonableness of the decision of Industrial to defend itself, 
the reasonableness of the investigation which needed to be done, 
the reasonableness of the decision and agreement to assert 
Industrial's independent defenses, and the dispute regarding the 
amount of attorney's fees. 
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26. Industrial's attorney fees are also reasonable in light 
of the fact that they were incurred over a ten-year period, the 
litigation was very complex, and the other defendants expended 
$626,065.62 in defense costs. 
27. The amounts paid by Industrial were liquidated and 
certain in amount as of the dates paid, were actually paid by 
Industrial on known and established dates, and are subject to and 
capable of interest calculation. 
28. Interest, calculated at 10% simple interest from the date 
each payment was received from Industrial by Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau to the date of this hearing amounts to $56,139.23. 
29. In light of all the factors, the court concludes that a 
total of fees and costs of $171,316.89 is reasonable, and was 
actually and necessarily incurred by Industrial in defense of this 
action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Industrial is entitled to recover from Hood under the 
Indemnity Agreement of April 15, 1981, and the Stipulation of April 
4, 1988, total attorney's fees and costs in the principal amount 
of $115,177.61; and 
2. As part of its reasonable fees and costs, Industrial is 
further entitled to recover from Hood pre-judgment interest on all 
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fee expenditures at the simple rate of 10% per annum, calculated 
from the date of fee payments, for a total amount of $56,139.23. 
3, Judgment should be entered accordingly, against Hood 
Corporation and in favor of Industrial Indemnity Company in the 
total amount of $171,316.89, and that interest thereon should 
accrue, from the date the Judgment is entered, at the judgment rate 
of interest, 12% per annum. 
DATED this jSC^day of IIAUOL . 1993. 
BY THE COURT****^  \ 
SDUnd.Ind. Conclusions 
- l i -
A-OC\o:>- i 3475 
PQ 
X 
Q 
Z 
W ft. 
OH 
^ 3 
SCOTT DANIELS (A0813) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Industrial Indemnity 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et 
al., 
Defendants. Civil No. C-84-2857 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Cross-Claimant and Judge David S. Young 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOOD CORPORATION, et al. 
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JUDGMENT 
Cross- and Third-
Party Defendants. 
On March 4, 1993, a hearing was held to determine 
reasonableness of attorney's fees incurred by Industrial Indemnity 
Company in the above-entitled matter, and the liability of Hood 
Corporation to pay those fees, Judge David S. Young presiding. 
Industrial Indemnity Company was represented by its attorney, Scott 
Daniels. Hood Corporation was represented by its attorney, Robert 
M. Anderson. Witnesses were sworn and called, exhibits were 
admitted and attorneys were allowed to present argument. The Court 
being fully informed in the premises and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the 
following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Industrial 
Indemnity Company, have Judgment against Hood Corporation, in the 
amount of $171,316.89, and that interest thereon accrue at the 
Judgment rate of interest, 12% per annum. 
DATED this ffi^day of H/JAu^^ ^ 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ , • 
SD\Ind.Ind\Judgment 
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Attorneys for Industrial Indemnity 
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et 
al., 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION OF INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, HOOD 
CORPORATION AND B. M. 
LAULHERE 
No^C 06 2657 
Judge David S. Young 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Cross-Claimant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs 
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HOOD CORPORATION, et al. 
Cross- and Third-Party 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Industrial Indemnity Company ("Industrial"), a 
California corporation and third-party plaintiff, cross-
defendant Hood Corporation ("Hood"), and third-party defendant 
B. M. Laulhere ("Laulhere"), and agree and stipulate as follows: 
1. On or about April 15, 1981, Hood and Laulhere (the 
"Indemnitors") each executed a Contract of Indemnity (General) 
(the "Indemnity Agreement") by which Indemnitors agreed to 
indemnify Industrial, and to hold it harmless from, among other 
things, "any and all liabilities, claims, demands, losses, 
damages, costs, attorneys fees, judgments and expenses of 
whatever kind or nature" that Industrial might sustain or incur 
by reason of or in consequence of Industrial's issuance of 
bonds for work performed or to be performed by James 
Constructors, Inc., one of Hood's subsidiary companies. The 
Indemnity Agreement also entitles Industrial to require the 
Indemnitors to post collateral in the amount of any claim made 
against Industrial's bonds,together with a reasonable sum for 
costs and attorneys' fees. 
2. Relying upon the Indemnity Agreement, Industrial 
issued certain contractor performance and payment bonds in the 
-2-
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face amount of $1,128,481.00 in connection with a contract 
between James Constructors, Inc., and the City of Salt Lake, 
Utah, for a project known generally as the "Terminal Park Water 
Transmission Pipeline, Water Main Extension No. 35-4184." 
3. The undersigned parties stipulate and agree that the 
Indemnity Agreement signed by Hood and Laulhere covers the 
bonds above described and that pursuant to said Indemnity 
Agreement Hood and Laulhere are liable for any payments 
Industrial may be obligated to make pursuant to the terms of 
the bonds, together with other costs and reasonable attorneys' 
fees incurred by Industrial in connection with those claims. 
4. By a Verified Complaint dated June 28, 1984, Salt Lake 
City Corporation filed suit against James Constructors, Inc., 
and Industrial (the "Complaint") alleging, among other things, 
that there was a failure of performance under the construction 
contract described in paragraph 2 above. The Complaint claims 
damages against Industrial under the bonds in a sum in excess 
of $2,000,000. 
5. By Crossclaim and Third-Party Complaint in this 
action, Industrial seeks indemnification from Indemnitors and 
otherwise seeks enforcement of its rights under the Indemnity 
Agreement. 
6. It is the desire of the parties to this Stipulation to 
resolve some of the issues presented under the Indemnity 
-3-
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Agreement and the Crossclaim/Third-Party Complaint without 
litigation, and without entwining those issues with the under-
lying claims and issues in the suit by Salt Lake Corporation. 
Accordingly, the parties hereby agree to a complete resolution 
of the specified claims raised by Crossclaim/Third Party 
Complaint or otherwise related to Indemnitors' obligations of 
indemnity as hereinafter set forth. 
7. Hood and Laulhere hereby waive any defenses that they 
might assert, now or hereafter, to the Indemnity Agreement, and 
jointly and severally agree and stipulate that if Salt Lake 
City Corporation obtains a judgment against Industrial on the 
underlying claims of the Complaint, the Court, upon ex parte 
application by Industrial Indemnity, and without further notice 
to Indemnitors, shall enter an immediate and final judgment in 
like amount over in favor of Industrial and against Indemnitors 
Hood and Laulhere jointly and severally. 
8. Independent of and in addition to the amount of any 
judgment over against Indemnitors as outlined in paragraph 7 
above, Industrial Indemnity shall be entitled to further judg-
ment against Hood and Laulhere, jointly and severally, upon 
motion and supporting affidavit, for Industrial's costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this action or otherwise 
in connection with the described bonds furnished to, for, or at 
the request of James, Hood or Laulhere, subject only to rights 
-4-
of Hood and Laulhere to request a hearing with respect to the 
reasonableness of the claimed costs and attorneys fees. All 
parties agree to be bound by the Court's determination of 
reasonableness. 
9. Joint and several execution may issue immediately upon 
entry of judgments pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 above. 
10. In addition to all of the foregoing, Indemnitors Hood 
and Laulhere confirm their obligations to hold Industrial 
Indemnity harmless from any enforcement of and execution upon 
that judgment entered against James Constructors and Industrial 
Indemnity in favor of Ortega Ru in that certain action, also 
involving claims on the described bonds, entitled Orteqa-Ru v. 
James Constructors, et al., Third District (Utah) Case 
No. , and currently on appeal before the Utah Supreme 
Court. Industrial Indemnity may have judgment (or may supple-
ment judgment) against indemnitors Hood and Laulhere in accor-
dance with paragraph 7 above in the event of affirmance of the 
Orteqa-Ru judgment and in the amount of any demand or execution 
upon Industrial Indemnity in payment and enforcement of said 
judgment. 
11. As consideration for Hood and Laulhere1s Stipulation 
hereunder, Industrial agrees not to require the posting of 
collateral or other security under the Indemnity Agreement, 
unless the net worth of Hood Corporation deteriorates more than 
Q0C3Cto 
A- cooo-;3 
twenty percent (20%) from its 1987 tax year end audited 
financial statement. Hood and Laulhere shall submit financial 
statements and other proof of financial condition at any time 
at the request of Industrial. 
12. Industrial Indemnity specifically reserves all rights 
under the Indemnity Agreement. 
DATED this /f^day of April, 1988. 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY Y/latfc+to^ 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA: 
COUNTY OF tfajPf^tfz/^ 
AlftikfiWS 
ss. 
) 
On the /f day of April, 1988, personally appeared before 
^ $/9/sn/)tr /T6YA*-J the /3#^7Vj/ ^£r 
:Oreqc Industrial Indemnity, who duly signed the fo going Stipulation 
on behalf of Industrial Indemnity, and states that it is true 
and correct as to his information, knowledge and belief. 
C$ ^f^Th^ » 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at cf*/**~ /*&• ^^o^; t /J/T4/C 
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HOOD CORPORATION 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANTCETJIS ) 
On t h e 14th day of A p r i l , 1988, p e r s o n a l l y appeared before 
me Marc Laulhere / t h e President of Hood 
Corpora t ion , who duly s igned t h e foregoing S t i p u l a t i o n on behalf 
of Hood Corpora t ion , and s t a t e s t h a t i t i s t r u e and c o r r e c t as 
t o h i s in fo rmat ion , knowledge and b e l i e f . 
My Commission Exp i r e s : 
June 7, 1989 
Wilt t ier , Cfrii 
NOTARY PUBLI 
Residing at fornia 
r?&?ju;.j; itmt Mas 
^ . f ^ s ^ v OFFICIAL SEAL 
/ fW? v5&a BEVERLY J. YACKS 
L*"V>'*-«\*iKJ NOTARY PUBLIC-CALIFORNIA 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
My Co mm. Expires June 7, 1989 
STATE OF _ 
COUNTY OF _ 
On the 
B. M. LAULHERE 
SS. 
day of April, 1988, personally appeared before 
me B. M. Laulhere, who duly acknowledged to me that he signed 
-7- QOLSCG 
the foregoing Stipulation, and that the same is true as to his 
information, knowledge and belief. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at _ 
My Commission Expires 
SCMDS142 
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INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY 
1 HEREINAFTER CALLED THE SURETY 
1 HOME OFFICE 
1 Lan Francisco, Cal i forn ia 
IK bust tit At 
tKlbtMNtTY 
CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY 
(GENERAL) 
DOND DilP". 
I KNOW ALL MEN UY THESE PRESENTS that whereas, at the special instance ind request of the undersigned, hereinafter culled 
2 Indemnitors, and upon the express condition that this instrument be executed, the. 
3 INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
_, hereinafter called Surely, \ut oz KJiali oi 
W. C. JAMES, INC. 
PiintipaKt) 
hereinafter called Principal, executed, or procured the execution of, and may, from time to time, execute, or procure the execution 
of certain bonds, undertakings or instruments of guarantee (all of which are hereinafter included within the term "bonds") as have 
been, or may hereafter, be applied for by said Principal; and 
9 Whereas, the Indemnitors have a substantia), material and beneficial interest in obtaining the said bonds; 
10 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of other good and valuable considerations, the receipt of which is 
11 hereby acknowledged, and of the prior or future execution of said bonds, the Indemnitors hereby agree and bind themselves, their 
12 heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, jointly and severally, as follows: 
13 First. That the Indemnitors will pay, or cause to be paid, to the Surely, upon the execution of each of the said bonds, and 
14 annually thereafter in advance, on the corresponding date of succeeding years, and until it has been served with competent k^ul 
15 evidence of its discharge from all liability upon such bonds, the annual premium or charge computed in accordance with the 
16 Surety's regular manual of rates in effect on the date said premiums become due. 
17 Second. That the Indemnitors shall and will at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the Surety, its Co-Sureties or 
IK Reinsurers and its or their successors and assigns, from and against any and all liabilities, claims, demands, losses, damages, costs. 
IV counsel fees, judgments, and expense of whatever kind or nature, that the Surety shall or may for any cause at any tunc sustain <»r 
20 incur by reason of or in consequence of the said bonds or any renewal thereof or any new bonds issued in continuation thcrcol oi 
21 as a substitute therefor or in connection with any litigation, investigation or other matters connected therewith: that if the Surety 
22 shall set up a reserve to cover any claim, suit or judgment under any such bonds, the Indemnitor will, immediately upon demand. 
23 deposit with the Surety a sum of money or acceptable security equal to such reserve, such sum in be held by the Surety as collateral 
24 security on said bonds; and any such collateral security shall be held subject to the terms of the Surety's regular form of "f olhierul 
25 Agreement." which is hereby made a part of this instrument with the same force and effect as if set out at length herein. The Surety 
26 shall be entitled to charge said Indemnitors, and said Indemnitors, and each of them, agree to pay for any and all disbursements 
27 made by it in good faith with respect to the matters herein contemplated by this agreement, under the belief that it is or was liable 
28 for the sums and amounts so disbursed, or that it was necessary or expedient to make such disbursements, whether or not such 
29 liability, necessity or expediency existed. An itemized statement of such disbursements made by the Surety for any of the purposes 
30 specified herein, sworn to by an Officer of the Surety, or the voucher or vouchers for such disbursements, shall be prima facie evi-
31 dence of the liability of the Indemnitors to reimburse the Surety for such disbursements, with interest; and if the Surety shall bring 
32 suit to enforce any obligation of the Indemnitors under this instrument, the Indemnitors shall be liable for the costs and expenses. 
33 including fees of attorneys, incurred in prosecuting such suit, and such costs and expenses shall be included in any judgment that 
34 may be rendered against the Indemnitors. 
35 Third. The Surety without notice to the Indemnitors has the right and is hereby authorized but not required, (a) from time to 
36 time, to make or consent to any change in any such bonds or to issue any substitute for or any renewal of any such bonds, and this 
37 instrument shall apply to such substituted or changed bonds or renewal; (b) to take such steps as the Surety may deem necessary or 
38 proper to obtain release from liability under any such bonds, and (c) to pay, satisfy, adjust, settle or compromise any claim or suit 
3V arising under said bonds and, with respect to any such claim or suit, to take any action it may deem appropriate or refrain from 
40 taking any action it may deem inappropriate. 
4 I Fourth. If any such bonds be given in connection with a contract, the Surety has the right and is hereby authorized, hut not 
42 required, (a) to consent to any change, alteration or modification in the contract or in the plans and specifications relating thereto; 
4 3 (b) from time to time to make or guarantee advances or loans for the purpose of the contract and such guarantees, advances or 
44 loans shall be conclusively presumed to be a loss hereunder notwithstanding that said guarantees, advances or loans, or any part 
45 thereof, have not been used for the purpose of the contract; (c) in event of the abandonment, forfeiture or breach of the contract 
4f. or the breach of any bonds given for the performance thereof or in connection therewith or the inability, failure, neglect or refusal 
47 to pay when due, for labor or materials used in the prosecution of the contract, to take possession of the work under the contrail 
JS and, at the expense of the Indemnitors, to complete the contract or cause the same to be completed or to consent lo the completion 
J,J thereof, and to take any other action which the Surety, in its sole discretion, may deem appropriate; and the Indemnitors herein 
t) assign, transfer and set over to the Surety (to be effective as of the dale of such bond or bonds, but only in the event of abandon 
I inent, forfeiture, breach, failure, neglect, refusal or inability as aforesaid) all of their rights under the contract, including their nghi 
J title and interest in and to (I) all sub-contracts let in connection therewith, (2) all machinery, plant,equipment, tools and maicn..u 
• which shall be upon the site of the work or elsewhere for the purposes of the contract, including all materials ordered for the ion 
\ tiact, and (3) any and all sums due under the contract at the time of such abandonment, forfeiture, breach. Iailuie.neulewi.rclus.il 
;
 or inability as aforesaid, or which may thereafter become due, and the Indemnitors hereby authorize the Surety lo m»l«»i\e in tin 
•• name tit lite payee and to collect any check, draft, wanant or other instrument made or issued in payment ot an> sm.lt sum and u> 
• ' disburse the proceeds thereof. 
x Filth. The Indemnitors hereby waive notice of the execution of any such bonds and notice of any breach Ihcicol or ol any 
•' act or default that may give rise to claim thereunder or hereunder. 
I'VJJ R J I 1 / 7 J J A- wcr:,2 tetfiwrr-O 
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Si*i*i Hurt ifcc Itt&wii*.** »f frquettmg the Surely lo prosecute, defend. «akc pari in any action, MIII. proceeding. 
#p.-.il. HI mut tff em*;, or lo defend any claim or demand, will place in the possession of the Surety funds or securities, which in 
.he sole opmiou of the Surely, arc sufficient lo cover any costs, charges, and expenses that the Surety may incur in complying with 
Ihe said request ami also lufficicni lo cover (he amount of any liability, order, adjustment, or adjudication that may result from a 
compliance with Ihe said request. Provided, lhal Surety may, If it sees fit, place the matter in Ihe hands of its attorneys and shall 
UJVC the right lo handle if as i! may deem best and in such event, the Surely may, if it sees fit, settle such action, etc., at any stage 
or pjy any judgment whereupon Ihe Indemnitors agree to pay the Surety the amount of such settlement or judgment and any and 
all costs, charges and expenses of every nature, including attorney's fees together with legal interest thereon until paid. 
Seventh That Ihe Surety at its option shall have and may exercise in the name of the Indemnitors or otherwise, every right. 
i»9 remedy, and demand that the Indemnitors may have for the recovery of any sums paid by the Surety under the said bonds or any 
70 renewal thereof or any new bonds issued in continuation thereof or as a substitute therefor; and the Indemnitors do hereby assign 
71 all the said rights, remedies and demands to the Surety with full power and authority to take such action in regard thereto in the 
72 name of the Indemnitors or otherwise as the Indemnitors might take if such assignment had not been made;and the Indemnitors 
73 hereby appoint the Surety the Indemnitors' attorney for such purposes. 
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Eighth. That in Ihe event of Mny claim or demand being mode by the Surety against the Indemnitor, by reason of or hi con 
sequence of the execution of the said bonds or any renewal thereof or any new bonds issued in continuation thereof or as a substi-
tute therefor. Ihe Surety is hereby expressly authorized to settle with one or more of the Indemnitors individually, and without 
reference lo the others, and such settlement or composition shall not affect the liability of any of the other Indemnitors, and the 
Indemnitors hereby expressly waive Ihe right to be discharged and released by reason of or in consequence of the release of one or 
more of the joint debtors, and hereby consent to any settlement or composition that may hereafter be made. 
Ninth. That the rights and remedies that the Surety may be subrogated to or may otherwise have, acquire, exercise, and 
enforce shall not in any way be limited or abridged by this agreement nor by the acceptance of any payment for the said suretyship 
nor by any agreement to accept other security nor by the acceptance of other security nor by the assent lo any act of the Principal 
named in the said bonds nor by the assent to any act of any person acting in behalf of Ihe said Principal or of Ihe Indemnitors, nor 
shall this jgieeincnt impose on the Surety any liability that it would not have were this agreement not executed. 
Tenth. The liability of the Indemnitors hereunder shall not be affected by the failure of the Principal to sign any such bond 
nor by any claim that other indemnity or security was lo have been obtained, not by Ihe release of any indemnity, or the return or 
exchange of any collateral, that may have been obtained. In case Ihe execution of this agreement by any o\ the Indemnitors be 
defective or invalid lor any reason, such defect or invalidity shall not in any manner affect the validity of (his agreement or the 
liability hereunder as to any and all of the Indemnitors properly executing this agreement; it is expressly understood that each and 
every ol ihe Indemnitors joining herein shall be and remain fully bound and liable hereunder lo the same extent as if such defect 
and invalidity had not existed. 
Eleventh. The company, at its option, may decline to execute or participate in or procure the execution of any bonds 
requested on behalf of said Principal without incurring any liability whatsoever to the Indemnitors. 
Twelfth. That suits may be brought hereunder as causes of action may accrue, and the bringing of one or more suits or the 
recovery of judgment or judgments therein shall not prejudice or bar the bringing of suits upon other causes of action, whether 
theretofore or thereafter arising. 
Thirteenth. That this agreement shall be liberally construed so as to fully protect and indemnify the Surety. 
Fourteenth. This Contract of Indemnity shall continue in full force and effect until canceled by the Indemnitors; notice 6f 
cancelation shall be given by registered letter addressed to the Surety at its office at 255 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.; under 
no circumstances, however, shall such cancelation alter or change the effect of this agreement upon any bonds already executed, nor 
shall cancelation notice by one Indemnitor in any manner alter or change the effect of this agreement as to any other Indemnitor. 
Fifteenth. Wherever used in this instrument the plural term shall include the singular and the singular shall include the plural. 
as the circumstances require. 
Sixteenth. This instrument may not be changed or altered or modified orally. 
Seventeenth. Wherever the word or term Principal is used in this agreement, it shall and does include the person, firm or cor-
poration so named and any partnership, joint venture or other firm of any nature in which the Principal is a partner, joint venturer 
or member of any sort and this agreement also applies to and covers any bonds in connection with any contract where the Principal 
acts as a joint venturer, partner of, or in any other capacity. 
Eighteenth. 
UO 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Indemnitors have hereunto set their hands and affixed their teals on thit 1 5 t h -day 
nf A p r i l 
- .19. 
y A t t e s t : JJLAALYA, 
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Barbara Ann James Se/retary 
-h n. 
• t t e s 
Jose Rey 
<w<. 
S e c r e t a r y 
w. c. JAMES. iyc. 
^: JU#. 
V. C. James Pres ident 
^-HOOD CORPORATION / [ ( S e a l ) 
Marc Laulhere P r e s i d e n t 
/BV= 3m.r<z-*~*/L. 
B. M. Laulhere I n d i v i d u a l l y 
--••c ti\ 
At a • - - . 
iKviuifcit *u Special) 
HOOD CORPORATION 
i (he JLday or / May i»8T (hciciuaficr called Corporation), duly called and held on I 
a quorum being present, the following Preamble and Resolution were adopted: 
"Will Kl AS. this r<»ipotation has a financial, material and beneficial interest in transactions in which 
W.C.JAMES, I N C . . 
(Nairn* iiiul A»Mfr\N ol I ' t imipah 
(heieinaltcr called Principal) has applied or will apply lo the Surely (hereinafter called Surety), for certain bonds 
or undertakings of whatever kind or nature; and 
••RI'SOLVr.l) that the officer* authorized lo execute documents in behalf of this Corporation, be and 
they a 10 he»eb> authorized and empowered lo execute any indemnity agreement or agreements required hy the 
Surety as consideration for the execution hy it ot bonds or undertakings of whatever kind or nature in behalf ol 
the I'imcipal described. 
*'RI SOI VI I) I UR1III R. that the said officers be ami Ihey aie hereby authorized ami empowered, at 
any time prior or subsequent to the execution by said Surety ot any such bonds or tmdcitakiugs. to execute any 
ami all amendments In said indemnity agreement or agreements; and to execute any other or further agreements 
relating to any such hnruts 01 undertakings or lo any collateral that may have been deposited with the Surely in 
connection therewith; and lo lake any and all other actions that may be requested or required by the Surdy in 
the piemises: 
MRKSOLVI;.l) PURTIII-R, that the xaid officers be and Ihey arc hereby authorized and empowered to 
affix the corporate seal to Mich indemnity agreement or agreements and to any and all amendments lo said indem-
nity agreement or agreements and to any other or further agreements." 
I. *J°-BJL7*e.y . Secretary of the Corporation, have compared 
the foregoing preamble and resolution with the original thereof, as recorded in the Minute Hook of said Corpora-
lion, and do certify that Ihc name arc correct and true transcripts therefrom, and of ihe whole of said original 
preamble and resolution. 
y 
• / 
The officers authorized lo execute documents in behalf of ibis Corporation are; 
W. C .James - President^ _ 
"Barbajra^rm""James '-' Secretary ~~ " 
(liven iiiulcr my hand and Ihc seal of Ihc Corporation, in Ihc City of * W h l t t l e r . 
state of / . California x\*Sll , lay „ r X May ,,,gT_ 
Secretary ' 
~ **. *"v .-w / N < 
INDIVIDUAL VERIFICATION 
ATFnr -'' CALIFORNIA j 
cnumvnrS LOS ANGELES ) "" 
On this y 1 5 t h day of j ^ &P£JJ 19 ^01 , bclmr »M 
personally came B.tt .Laulhere _ _ 
to 
the 
me known and known Yo Vrtefo'Bt the lhd^dda1(s')'wrh,0 executed the foregoing Instalment, and acknowledged that he/they executed 
X ^>L±S iu>/«'. US COUNTY | y ^ /7 jf Notary Public 
i My Commission l>niies May 2b, 1981 
INDIVIDUAL VERIFICATION 
r 
STATE OF 1 
/ / 
COUNTY OF 1 -
(M 
On this 15 day of j ^ (/t^i^ 19 /*i , before me 
personally came W. C. James and Barbara Ann James 
to me known and known to me to be the indtvidual(s) who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that he/they executed 
the same. ^ / I / " A 
NoUt>- Public 
PARTNERSHIP VERIFICATION 
STATE OF. 
COUNTY OF. 
On this day of 19 , before me 
personally came _ _ _ _ _ 
to me known, and stated that he partner in the firm of. 
and acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instrument as the act of the aaid Firm. 
Notary Public 
CORPORATE VERIFICATION 
STATE OF •'/ ML
 } 
COUNTY OF 
On this day of {, i'$** K \9JJLL.% before me 
peraonaliy came W. C. James 
15.  of /L (.<<$*** »9 4\ . i 
he resides in the City of ^L (,///!'Il/v' to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that 
that he is the P r e s i d e n t 
0f t n e W.C.James, I n c . 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the aeal of the uid corporation; that the seal 
affixed to the aaid instrument is such corporate aeal; that It was so afTixed by the order of the Board of Directors of said corporation, and 
that he signed his name thereto by like order. ^ 
/ Y)rA';^ Y^ v? 
Notify Pablu 
A - 000025 
INDIVIDUAL VERIFICATION 
/ATE OF. 
COUNTY OF. 
On this. 
1" 
. day of. -19 , before me 
personally ctme 
to me known and known to me to be the Individuals) who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that he/they executed 
the same. 
PARTNERSHIP VERIFICATION 
STATE OF. 
COUNTY OF. I-
Or. !.•.«..... .2r/tf . 
personally ctme. 
to me known, and stated that be partner in the firm of . 
Notary Public 
and acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instrument as the act of the said firm. 
STATEOF *' CALIFORNIA 
CORPORATE VERIFICATION 
COUNTY OF * 10$ ANGELES 
On thisal ^5th 
} -
. day of / April 
personally came. Marc Laulhere 
Sour) hut/Ui 
81 1 9 . L _ . , before me 
to me known, who, being by me duly sworn,deposes and says that he resides in the City nf ^ HuntinQton Beach, 
C a l i f o r n i a that he is the Pres ident 
of the. lioo'J Corporation 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of the said corporation; that the seal 
affixed to the said instrument is such corporate sea); that it was so affixed by the orderjjf the Board of Directors of waid corporation, and 
.that he signed hianame theretohy.likeAxdei.. 
: A V ^ ' V ' ^ ('.'ut.lAi MA! 
! fi.-+M!::\ i.,,::."Y !. Y.M:KS 
• V V P . - ' V ' : ' * U •*••«<' • : '' •• >•: i • MIII)WNIA 
: \ ^ . v * / r.-:. • . •. ."•jn IN 
; > < i ^ - ^ ifjs AI.J.: : i S lliUNTY 
f My Commission Cxpiias M<iy 25, 19B1' 
l>Mtu»M»M»l*Mlil»tl l lM»l>IUUII 
m~T Notary Public 
CORPORATE VERIFICATION 
STATE OF. 
COUNTY OF. 
On this. 
} " 
.day of. .19. ..before me 
personally came. 
to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that he resides in the City of. 
that he is the 
of the -
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of the said corporation; that the *cal 
:*V?K*td to the said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by the order of the Board of Directors of said corporation, and 
thai hr. sife-rod .his name thereto by like order. 
•* A A A A r s n 
NotnO PMHII. 
z 
P. 
ojgs* | r*o»«f\ v i^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
0% 0% 
(QutyuJC 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, 
CROSS-CLAIMANT AND 
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
HOOD CORPORATION, ET AL., 
CROSS AND THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANT, 
CIVIL NO. C-84-090-28 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
57 
BE IT REMEMERED THAT ON THURSDAY, THE HTH DAY 
OF MARCH, 1993, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 8:30 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
*pf5*miCTCWRT 
T>kdUMO.ciaJGi3tnct 
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1 NEY, MET WITH THE CITY ENGINEERS, REVIEWED THE INFORMATION, 
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CONTACTED A CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANT AND WE WALKED THE JOB 
AND TOOK SOME PICTURES AND LOOKED OVER THE SITUATION. AND 
IT WAS VERY OBVIOUS THAT THERE WAS A MASSIVE FAILURE—THAT 
DOESN'T GO TO CAUSATION, BUT THERE WAS A MASSIVE FAILURE. 
Q ON THE PIPELINE? 
A OF THE PIPELINE. YES. WE'VE EITHER TOOK OR 
SAW PICTURES OF CARS FALLING DOWN INTO THE COMPLETED AND 
PAVED TRENCH THAT HAD CAVED DOWN SEVERAL FEEL BELOW THE 
SURFACE, THE OTHERWISE SURFACE. AND SO IT WAS OBVIOUS WE 
HAD A PROBLEM TO DEAL WITH. IT WAS NOT A SMALL CASE. THE 
BOND WAS SLIGHTLY UNDER 1.3 MILLION DOLLARS BUT THE CITY 
CONTENDED THAT IT WAS SPENDING MORE THAN TWO MILLION DOLLARS 
TO RE-DO THE WORK AND, IN FACT, THE CITY TORE OUT THE WHOLE 
PIPELINE AND REPLACED THE WHOLE THING. AND SO I CONSIDERED 
IT A NASTY, DANGEROUS CASE. 
NOW I'VE BEEN INVOLVED IN NASTY, DANGEROUS CASES 
BEFORE, BUT THE DIFFERENCE HERE WAS THAT HOOD CORPORATION 
SEEMED UNINTERESTED IN WHAT WAS HAPPENING OUT HERE AND HAD 
LET THE DEFENSE OF THE CASE TO JAMES WHO, AT THAT POINT, 
CONSISTED OF THE PRESIDENT OF JAMES, A FELLOW NAMED JIM 
FOREMAN, AND HIS SECRETARY. AND JAMES HAD HIRED REED BROWN 
AS ITS ATTORNEY AND THEY WERE BUSILY DEFENDING THIS CASE. 
BUT WE KNEW, AND JAMES KNEW THAT JAMES COULDN'T PAY ANY 
JUDGMENTS AND WE TRIED TO INTEREST HOOD CORPORATION IN THE 
19 
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1 CASE TO COME OUT, INVESTIGATE, DO SOME INDEPENDENT WORK 
2 TO SEE WHAT, TO SEE WHAT THE EXPOSURE REALLY WAS RATHER 
3 THAN RELYING ON THE GUY WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT. 
4 AND WE COULDN'T GET THAT INTEREST. 
5 Q AS AN ATTORNEY REPRESENTING THE SURETY DID YOU 
6 FEEL YOU HAD A DUTY TO DO AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION? 
7 A YES. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
8 THAT HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON INSURANCE COMPANIES HAS ALSO BEEN 
9 IMPOSED ON SURETY COMPANIES. MAINLY BECAUSE SURETY COMPANIE^ 
10 WERE LUMPED IN STATE INSURANCE CODES AS INSURERS. SURETIES 
11 AREN'T INSURERS BUT THEY'RE PART OF THE INSURANCE CODE. 
12 AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE CASES AROUND THE COUNTRY HAVE MADE 
13 IT PRETY CLEAR NOW THAT A SURETY HAS - DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
14 AND FAIR DEALING AND PART OF THAT DUTY IS TO INDEPENDENTLY 
15 EXAMINE THE PROJECT, WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE, AND TO MAKE 
16 AN EVALUATION AND TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PART RATHER THAN MERELY 
17 TENDER. AND SO IN THE OLD DAYS WHEN SURETY LAWYERS DIDN'T 
18 HAVE MUCH TO DO THEY JUST TENDERED TO THE PRINCIPAL. IN 
19 THIS DAY AND AGE WE DON'T HAVE THAT LUXURY. WE HAVE TO, 
20 EVEN ON SMALL CLAIMS, EVEN ON SUBCONTRACTOR'S CLAIMS, WE 
21 HAVE A DUTY TO GO OUT AND INDEPENDENTLY FIND OUT IF WE CAN, 
22 WHAT HAPPENED. AND THAT MEANS ALSO, IN A NUMBER OF STATES, 
23 INCLUDING CALIFORNIA, HAVE SAID THAT WE CAN'T RELY ON THE 
24 REPRESENTATIONS OF OUR PRINCIPAL OBLIGOR, IN THIS CASE, 
25 JAMES. WE CAN'T RELY ON WHAT THEY SAY. WE HAVE TO CONDUCT 
20 
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1 OUR OWN INVESTIGATION AND THAT'S WHAT I ATTEMPTED TO DO. 
2 Q WELL--AND WHAT DID YOU DO TO TRY TO GET HOOD 
3 INVOLVED AND INTERESTED IN THE LAWSUIT? 
4 A REED BROWN WAS THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING JAMES 
5 AND DEALING WITH BOTH JAMES AND HOOD AT THAT T I M E . AND 
6 VERY EARLY IN OUR INVESTIGATIONS WE SAW THAT THE EXPOSURE, 
7 THE POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO DAMAGES WAS VERY GREAT. AND WE 
8 TRIED TO GET MR. BROWN TO GET HOOD CORPORATION UP HERE TO 
9 INDEPENDENTLY TAKE A LOOK AT IT AND INDEPENDENTLY ASSESS 
10 ITS EXPOSURE BECAUSE HOOD WOULD EVENTUALLY BE PAYING I T , 
11 WE HOPED. 
12 Q I SEE. WELL NOW, AS I LOOK AT THE CHART, P-*+, 
13 IT SEEMS TO BE PRETTY FLAT ON THE BOTTOM AND THERE'S THREE 
14 AREAS OF A C T I V I T Y . S IMILARLY, LOOKING AT P-3 I SEE THREE | 
15 AREAS WHERE THERE'S SOME SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF FEES. THIS : 
16 TIME PERIOD WHEN YOU WERE DOING THE INVESTIGATION, WHEN 
17 DID THAT TAKE PLACE? 
18 A THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN BEGINNING ABOUT THE END 
19 OF MAY 1ST OR JUNE OF ' 8 4 . 
20 Q ABOUT HERE? 
21 A YES. AND THEN OVER APPROXIMATELY THE NEXT SEVERA(_ 
22 MONTHS. 
23 Q SO THIS AREA HERE IS YOUR AREA, AND I ' M REFERRING 
24 FOR THE RECORD TO EXHIB IT P-k, THE F I R S T , TO THE FAR LEFT, 
25 THE BAR GRAPHS, AND P - 3 , THE L ITTLE PEAKS. THIS AREA OF 
21 
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1 TIME WAS A TIME WHEN YOU WERE DOING YOUR INDEPENDENT INVESTI-
2 GATION? 
3 A THAT'S RIGHT. AND I PERSONALLY DID ALMOST ALL 
4 OF IT DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME. I INVOLVED A CONSTRUCTION 
5 CONSULTANT, ALSO MET EXTENSIVELY WITH REED BROWN, AND AT 
6 SOME EARLY POINT IN THAT PROCESS WE RENDERED THE DEFENSE 
7 TO JAMES AND MR. BROWN OBJECTED TO THE TENDER. AND SO HE 
8 AND I THEN DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF HIS OBJECTION. AND THE 
9 NATURE OF HIS OBJECTION WAS THAT IT WAS A SMALL OFFICE AND 
10 A BIG, DANGEROUS CASE AND HE REQUESTED OUR INVOLVEMENT IN 
11 IT. MY PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT TO ASSIST HIM AS HE DEFENDED 
12 JAMES. AND SO MR. BROWN AND I WORKED TOGETHER AND HE WORKED 
13 VERY HARD IN DEFENDING JAMES THROUGH THIS PERIOD. 
14 Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED EXHIBIT 6 
15 AND 7. EXHIBIT 6 PURPORTS TO BE A LETTER FROM YOU TO MR. 
16 BROWN. 
17 A YES. EXHIBIT 6 IS MY TENDER LETTER TO HIM AND 
18 EXHIBIT 7 IS A LETTER BACK TWO DAYS LATER OBJECTING TO THE 
19 TENDER AND SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD STAY INVOLVED. AND 
20 THEN WE HAD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AT LEAST, SHORTLY AFTER 
21 HIS LETTER, AND HE AGREED TO ACCEPT THE TENDER. HE, AT 
22 FIRST, WAS UNDER THE MISAPPREHENSION THAT IT WAS A POLICY 
23 OF INSURANCE AND WE HAD SOME DUTY TO COME IN AND DEFEND, 
24 AND AS WE DISCUSSED IT HE SAW THAT IT WASN'T AND, IN FACT, 
25 THERE'S AN INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, BUT HE NEVERTHELESS REQUESTED^ 
22 
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1
 INTERESTS IN THE CASE. 
2
 Q I SEE. WHAT ABOUT MR. BROWN? WAS HE, YOU KNOW, 
3
 INVOLVED IN--WELL, DID HE APPEAR TO BE FRUSTRATED WITH THE 
4
 SITUATION AS WELL? 
5
 A COME ABOUT THE END OF JUNE OF 1987 MR. BROWN 
6
 SUDDENLY WITHDREW AS COUNSEL FOR JAMES IN THE CASE. 
7
 Q BEFORE WE GET TO THAT I'M STILL TALKING ABOUT 
8
 UP-FRONT, YOUR CONCERNS AND WHY YOU CONSIDERED IT AN UNUSUAL 
9
 CASE. 
10
 A WELL, YES. TO SAY THAT MR. BROWN ONLY REPRESENTEE) 
11
 JAMES DIDN'T TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REALITIES BECAUSE JAMES 
12
 DIDN'T DO ANY FURTHER WORK, DIDN'T MAINTAIN AN OFFICE AFTER 
13
 A FEW MONTHS AND EVERYTHING CAME OUT OF HOOD. AND SO WHILE 
14
 TECHNICALLY REED BROWN REPRESENTED JAMES HE WAS GETTING 
15
 INFORMATION FROM HOOD, BUT THE FRUSTRATIONS WAS THAT IT 
16
 WAS A DANGEROUS CASE AND NOTHING WAS--HE HAD NO TOOLS, HE 
17
 HAD NO FINANCIAL TOOLS TO SETTLE THE CASE. 
18 Q
 W E R E THERE OTHER CLAIMS BEING RAISED AGAINST 
19
 I JAMES AT THIS TIME OR WAS THIS SALT LAKE CITY ONE THE ONLY 
ONE? 
A OH, YES. AND THAT MADE THE CASE UNUSUAL IN THIS 
2 2
 OTHER RESPECT. IT WASN'T JUST A MATTER OF ONE LAWSUIT, 
2 3
 THE PRINCIPAL ASKING THE SURETY TO TENDER THE DEFENSE SO 
2 4
 IT COULD HANDLE IT AND BE ECONOMICAL. AT THE SAME TIME 
2 5
 WE, AS INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY STARTED GETTING CLAIMS FROM 
20 
21 
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1 OTHER SUBCONTRACTORS AND MATERIAL MEN, NOT ONLY ON THIS 
2 JOB BUT ON SEVERAL OTHER JOBS, AND I HAD A TOTAL OF 12 OTHER 
3 CLAIMS THAT I HAD TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCUSS WITH MR. BROWN 
4 AND MAKE A DECISION AS TO WHAT TO DO. AND THREE OF THOSE 
5 CASES WERE LITIGATED THROUGH TRIAL AND JAMES LOST ALL THREE 
6 OF 'EM. AND TWO OF THOSE THREE WERE APPEALED AND THE APPEALS| 
7 WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN EACH CASE. AND SO WE WERE STARTING 
8 TO BUILD A TRACK RECORD AT THIS POINT AND ONE, IN PARTICULAR^ 
9 ORTEGA-RU--
10 Q YOU WANT TO SPELL THAT FOR THE REPORTER? 
11 A O-R-T-E-G-A HYPHEN R-U. OBTAINED A JUDGMENT 
12 OF ABOUT $65,000.00 IN TRIAL COURT, IT WAS APPEALED TO, 
13 I THINK, THE SUPREME COURT AT THAT TIME, AFFIRMED, AND THE 
14 JUDGMENT THEN WAS UP IN THE HIGH SEVENTY THOUSANDS AND 
15 NEITHER JAMES NOR HOOD PAID IT SO THEN I RECEIVED A CALL 
16 FROM GEORGE FADEL WONDERING IF I HAD ANY PARTICULAR PLACE 
17 THAT HE COULD ATTACH THE ASSETS OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY. 
18 Q HE WANTED TO COME DOWN AND TAKE OVER THE INSURANCE 
19 OFFICE OR SOMETHING? 
20 A YEAH. SO THAT PROMPTED A QUICK DRIVE OUT TO 
21 HIS OFFICE AND A CHECK IN HIS HANDS WITHIN 48 HOURS FOR 
22 INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY. 
23 Q NOW, YOU SAY THAT YOU HAD HIRED AN EXPERT TO 
24 LOOK AT THE PIPELINE. WHAT WAS YOUR EXPERT TELLING YOU? 
25 A THE EXPERT WAS SAYING THAT THERE'S NO QUESTION 
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THAT THE PIPELINE-
MR. ANDERSON: I'M GOING TO OBJECT ON HEARSAY 
GROUNDS. I THINK WE'RE GOING WAY FAR AFIELD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND I'M NOT SO SURE IT'S REALLY 
RELEVANT. I THINK THERE IS AN ADEQUATE FOUNDATION AS TO 
WHAT THEY WERE DOING AND MAYBE CROSS-EXAMINATION WOULD FOCUS 
ON HOOD'S CONCERNS. 
MR. DANIELS: OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK YOU THIS, MR. NORTON. 
FROM THE TIME WHEN YOU EARLIEST TENDERED THE DEFENSE TO 
HOOD THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO REASON THAT THEY COULD NOT 
HAVE SIMPLY STEPPED FORWARD, AND SINCE THEY WERE POTENTIALLY 
ON THE LINE HAVE TAKEN OVER AND RETAINED THEIR OWN COUNSEL 
TO DO THAT WHICH YOU WERE ULTIMATELY DOING THEREAFTER, ISN'T 
THAT CORRECT? 
THE WITNESS: YES. THEY WERE--THE PROBLEM WAS 
THAT WE HAD JAMES BEING DEFENDED AND HOOD NOT COMING FORWARD 
IN ANY CAPACITY. AND THAT RAISED MY STRESS LEVEL AND THAT 
19
 I OF MY CLIENT BECAUSE HOOD--AND THEN WHEN HOOD FINALLY DID 
2 0
 I COME FORWARD IT WAS THROUGH DAVID REEVE WHO WAS NEVER 
21
 ' INVOLVED ENOUGH IN THE CASE TO KEEP TRACK OF IT. 
2 2
 | Q (BY MR. DANIELS) WERE YOU TRYING TO TELL HOOD 
THAT THEY HAD A SERIOUS EXPOSURE ON THIS CASE? 
2 4
 | A YES. AND IN THE BEGINNING, THROUGH REED BROWN 
25
 ' AND THEN LATER IN A MEETING WHEN WE ACTUALLY, WHEN BROWN 
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1 TO SUCH RESERVE, SUCH SUM TO BE HELD BY THE SURETY AS 
2 COLLATERAL SECURITY." 
3 Q SO YOU DEMANDED THAT HOOD CORPORATION AND MR., 
4 WAS IT LAULHERE, STILL ALIVE AT THAT TIME? 
5 A I BELIEVE SO. 
6 Q SO YOU DEMANDED THAT THEY SET UP SOME COLLATERAL 
7 OR SOME SECURITY? 
8 A YES. 
9 Q WHAT WAS THEIR RESPONSE? 
10 A THEIR RESPONSE WAS MARK LAULHERE ASKED TO MEET 
11 AND BROUGHT WITH HIM HIS INSURANCE AGENT AND WE MET AND 
12 WE BROUGHT TOGETHER ALL THE ATTORNEYS AT THE SAME TIME. 
13 Q NOW MARK LAULHERE IS THE OTHER--MR. LAULHERE'S 
14 SON. 
15 A YES, I THINK HE'S PROBABLY THE MAJOR OWNER NOW. 
16 HE IS THE SON OF THE THEN OWNER. AND HE WAS ACTIVE. AND 
17 MARK MAY HAVE BEEN PRESIDENT OF THE COMPANY AT THAT TIME. 
18 Q OKAY. SO HE'S NOT PERSONALLY THE INDEMNITOR 
19 AND HE'S STILL ALIVE. 
20 A YES. 
21 Q AND WHAT WAS THEIR RESPONSE ABOUT, IN THIS 
22 MEETING, ABOUT PUTTING UP SOME SECURITY ON YOUR PART ABOUT 
23 THE CONTRACT? 
24 A WELL, THEY OBJECTED TO BEING NAMED IN THE SUIT, 
25 OBJECTED TO THE DEMAND FOR COLLATERAL. AND IT WAS MY STRONG 
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RECOMMENDATION TO MY CLIENT THAT WE OBTAIN COLLATERAL IF 
THE COMPANY WAS AS STRONG AS IT SAID IT WAS, THEN IT WOULD 
BE NO PROBLEM FOR IT TO GIVE US A SECURITY INTEREST IN A 
PIECE OF PROPERTY. I 
Q DID THEY PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME FINANCIALS AT 
THAT TIME? 
A YES. NOT AT THAT TIME BUT SHORTLY AFTER. 
Q OKAY. AND DID YOU REVIEW THOSE? j 
I 
A YES. 
Q WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT ACCEPTING THEIR CREDIT 
RATHER THAN HAVING THEM PUT UP COLLATERAL? 
A WELL, SEVERAL THINGS THAT, OF COURSE, WERE DIS-
TURBING. MY WIFE TELLS THE CHRISTMAS STORY ABOUT THE BARE | 
CHRISTMAS AND IT LOOKS LIKE CHRISTMAS AND IT FEELS LIKE | 
I 
CHRISTMAS AND IT SMELLS LIKE CHRISTMAS, OR EVERYTHING, BUT | 
I I 
IT DOESN'T FEEL LIKE CHRISTMAS. WELL, IN THIS CASE, THE j 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT SUGGESTED LARGE ASSETS, BUT THE ACTIONS J 
OF THE COMPANY IT DIDN'T LOOK LIKE IT AND IT DIDN'T ACT | 
LIKE IT AND IT CERTAINLY DIDN'T FEEL LIKE THERE WERE ASSETS 
THERE. AND SO WE WERE VERY CONCERNED. 
AND THEN IN READING BOTH THE '85 AND THE '87 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS I NOTED THAT OUR LETTERS CLAIMING THEY | 
HAD A POTENTIAL EXPOSURE OF AROUND THREE MILLION DOLLARS 
WASN'T EVEN IN THE AUDIT FINANCIAL STATEMENT. EITHER ONE. 
Q IT DIDN'T REFER TO THAT STATEMENT OR TO THAT 
37 
1 CLAIM? 
2 A IT DID NOT. 
3 Q DID YOU FEEL THAT WAS KIND OF A SERIOUS OMISSION? 
4 A WELL--AND WE WERE MADE AWARE OF, ABOUT THE SAME 
5 TIME, THAT THEY WERE HAVING TROUBLE IN HAWAII AND WERE WITH-
6 DRAWING THEIR OPERATIONS FROM HAWAII. AND WE DIDN'T KNOW 
7 WHAT ELSE WAS MISSING FROM THAT STATEMENT. 
8 Q SO YOU FELT THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY SHOULD 
9 STAND ON ITS CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO DEMAND COLLATERAL. 
10 A YEAH, IT WAS MY VERY STRONG RECOMMENDATION THAT 
11 WE DO IT. THE FEAR ALSO, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE THAT WE 
12 HAD HAD FOR THREE FULL YEARS WAS THAT JAMES WAS GOING TO 
13 LOSE THE CASE AND HOOD WOULD STAY IN LOS ANGELES AND INDUS-
14 TRIAL INDEMNITY WOULD THEN HAVE TO PAY THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT 
15 AND THEN GO TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TO SUE HOOD AND BE IN 
16 COURT DOWN THERE FOR ANOTHER FIVE AND A HALF YEARS BEFORE 
17 IT GOT A TRIAL DATE. 
18 Q SO THAT'S WHY YOU WANTED THEM JOINED IN THIS 
19 LAWSUIT. 
20 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
21 Q AND YOU FILED WHAT, A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
22 AGAINST THEM OR SOMETHING? 
23 A YES. 
24 Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED EXHIBIT P-ll 
25
 AND ASK YOU IF THAT'S YOUR LETTER DEMANDING SECURITY. 
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1 A YES. 
2 Q AND THEN THERE, DURING THIS LONG SORT OF DRY 
3
 SPELL. 
4 A YES. THERE WAS A PERIOD OF TIME WHEN THERE WAS 
5 QUITE EXTENSIVE DISCOVERY AND A LOT OF DEPOSITIONS AND A 
6
 LOT OF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SETTLEMENT AND THAT SORT OF THING. 
7
 MR. POWELL WAS HEAVILY INVOLVED AT THAT TIME. WHEN I FIRST 
8
 BECAME INVOLVED HE WAS NOT, AS I RECOLLECT, DIRECTLY 
9
 INVOLVED. HE CAME IN A LITTLE LATER. WHEN THE LIABILITY 
10
 CARRIER, I THINK HE REPRESENTED CIGNA, IF I'M NOT MISTAKEN, 
11
 HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN TO THE CASE, AND SO HE WAS DEFENDING 
"•2 ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE CLAIMS THAT THE CITY HAD MADE, 
13
 AND THOSE CLAIMS HAD TO DO WITH PROPERTY DAMAGE OCCURRING 
14
 AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE OF THE PIPELINE. AND HE WAS 
15
 ALWAYS IN A QUANDARY, AS I RECALL, AS TO HOW FAR HE SHOULD 
16
 GO, BECAUSE THE EXPOSURE OF CIGNA WAS JUST A SMALL PERCENTAGE 
17
 OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT. AND I RECALL MR. POWELL AND I DIS-
18
 CUSSING THAT FROM TIME TO TIME ABOUT HIS LIMITED ROLE, 
19
 ALTHOUGH, AS IT DEVELOPED, HE KIND OF BECAME THE LEAD LAWYER 
20 BECAUSE IN DEFENDING A SMALL CLAIM IT WAS NECESSARY FOR 
21
 HIM TO DEFEND A LOT OF THE OVERALL CLAIMS DEALING WITH NEGL1 
2 2
 GENT INSTALLATION OF THE PIPELINE AND ALL THE REST OF IT. 
2 3
 SO I THINK IT BECAME KIND OF A TAR BABY FOR HIM AND HE ENDEDj 
2 4
 UP DOING A LOT MORE THAN HE WANTED TO DO IN THAT REGARD. 
25 Q
 A N D HE WAS BEING PAID BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY? 
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1 Q "WE," MEANING YOU AND MR. POWELL? 
2 A ME AND MR. POWELL DISCUSSED IT. THE IDEA WAS 
3 THAT WE WERE COOPERATING WITH THEM IN EVERY WAY WE COULD. 
4 I WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTERESTED IN SAYING ANYTHING THAT WOULD 
5 UNDERMINE ANYTHING THEY DID, AND IN TERMS OF WHAT WAS GOING 
6 TO BE BROUGHT OUT THROUGH MR. POWELL. AND I KNEW WHAT THAT 
7 WAS GOING TO BE BEFORE THE DEPOSITION. AND HE DID IT. 
8 AND THERE WAS NO REASON FOR ME TO ASK QUESTIONS IN SOME 
9 OF THOSE DEPOSITIONS. 
10 Q WAS THERE ANY REASON FOR YOU TO GO AT ALL? 
11 A OH, ABSOLUTELY. 
12 Q WHAT WAS THAT? 
13 A I THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MALPRACTICE NOT TO 
14 ATTEND THOSE DEPOSITIONS. WE HAD, TO SOME DEGREE, AN ADVER-
15 SARIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH EVERYBODY ELSE AND IF SOMETHING 
16 HAD COME OUT AT THOSE DEPOSITIONS ADVERSE TO INDUSTRIAL 
17 INDEMNITY THE OTHER PARTIES MIGHT HAVE AGREED TO SOMETHING 
18 ON THE RECORD OR CONVINCED A WITNESS TO SAY SOMETHING WITHOU 
19 ANY CROSS-EXAMINATION THAT COULD HAVE JEOPARDIZED INDUS-
20 TRIAL'S POSITION. AND WE HAD TO BE THERE TO MAKE SURE THAT 
21 DIDN'T HAPPEN. 
22 Q OKAY. WAS MR. POWELL OF THE VIEW THAT THE CASE 
23 SHOULD ALSO BE SETTLED? 
24 A THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION. YOU'D HAVE TO ASK MR. 
25 POWELL THAT, BUT AS I RECALL, HE AND I WERE PRETTY MUCH 
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1 WAS HAPPENING THAT STARTED THIS, YOU KNOW, THIS TREND? 
2 A WELL, THE TREND ACTUALLY BEGAN, I GUESS, WITH 
3
 T H E APPEALS PROCESS. JAMES CONSTRUCTORS HAD HAD A COUNTER-
4 CLAIM OR, ACTUALLY, A SEPARATE ACTION AND COMPLAINT AGAINST 
5 SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION THAT WAS CONSOLIDATED WITH THE 
6 GREATER SALT LAKE CITY ACTION. 
7 Q LET ME FOCUS YOU A LITTLE MORE. IN OCTOBER OF 
8 I '90 WAS THERE A MEETING HELD AT THE ALTA CLUB? 
9 A THERE WAS IN OCTOBER, I THINK IT WAS OCTOBER 
10 23RD AT 7:30, WHICH IS GENERALLY A LITTLE BIT EARLIER THAN 
11 I COME INTO THE OFFICE. MR. BOB ANDERSON SUGGESTED THAT 
12 THE DEFENSE COUNSEL INVOLVED IN THAT MEET AT BREAKFAST AT 
13 THE ALTA CLUB. 
14 Q WHO WAS PRESENT? 
15 A TO MY RECOLLECTION MR. ANDERSON WAS THERE, ELWOOD 
16 POWELL WAS THERE, JAY JENSEN AND MYSELF. 
17 Q WHAT WAS DISCUSSED? 
•J8 A THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF PHILOSOPHIES 
19 AND STRATEGY CONCERNING DEFENSE OF THE ACTION, POST-APPEAL, 
20 WHO OUGHT TO BE DOING WHAT, WHAT POSITIONS OUGHT TO BE TAKEN 
21 MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT MR. ANDERSON HAD RECENTLY 
22 BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND I THINK THAT THERE WAS SOME 
23 GENERAL, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY, SOME GENERAL ANALYSIS 
24 OF THE POSITION OF THE CASE AT THAT TIME AND TO WHAT, IF 
25 ANY, OF THE DEFENSES THAT HAD BEEN RAISED BY JAMES AND BY 
1**6 
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2 THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF WHAT MOTIONS OUGHT 
3 TO BE MADE, WHETHER THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME ATTEMPT TO REFINE 
4 A PRE-TRIAL ORDER. AND IF MY RECOLLECTION SERVES ME 
5 CORRECTLY, MR. BEESLEY HAD OFFERED A PRE-TRIAL ORDER AT 
6 - ' ^RAMAT " R 
7 
8 SSFR1-! DtFENDAK 
r r
^
r
 ri\: IS 
RESURRECT 
SOME OF THOSE CLAIMS. 
Q WAS THE DECISION MADE TO MAKE A FINAL PUSH TO 
1,1 I RESURRENT THOSE CLAIMS? 
•M | A IT WAS. 
Q WHO SUGGESTED THAT; DO YOU REMEMBER? 
16 I A I DON'T REMEMBER SPECIFICALLY. I KNOW THERE 
1/ WAS SOME DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY OUGHT 
111 TO BE THE ONE TO DO THAT. AND THE CONSENSUS AMONG THOSE 
Hi PRESENT WAS THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY WAS IN THE BEST 
20 I POSITION TO DO THAT AND PROBALBY OUGHT TO TAKE THAT LEAD. 
Q WHAT WERE THOSE CLAIMS? 
22 I A THE CLAIMS WERE PRIMARILY RELATED TO AFFIRMATIVE 
23 DEFENSES THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY HAD MADE ARISING FROM 
24 NEGLIGENT INSPECTION. THAT WAS THE PRIMARY ONE. AS MR. 
25 NORTON INDICATED THERE WERE THREE PRIMARY DEFENSES THAT 
147 
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1 INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY HAD ASSERTED EARLY ON IN THE LITIGATION, 
2 A FAILURE OF TIMELY NOTICE BY SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION--
3 JUDGE YOUNG: SLOW DOWN, MR. SLAUGHTER. 
4 THE WITNESS: I'M EXCITED, YOUR HONOR. NOTICE 
5 WAS ONE ISSUE, OVERPAYMENT WAS ANOTHER ISSUE. 
6 Q (BY MR. DANIELS) WAS THERE ANY DECISION MADE 
7 ABOUT THE OVERPAYMENT ISSUE? 
8 I A MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT THERE WAS A DECISION 
9 MADE, WHETHER IN CONNECTION WITH THAT MEETING OR LATER, 
10 I DON'T RECALL, BUT--
11 Q LET ME SEE IF I UNDERSTAND THE OVERPAYMENT ISSUE. 
12 WAS THE CLAIM THAT SALT LAKE CITY HAD PAID JAMES TOO MUCH? 
13 A THERE'S A DEFENSE AVAILABLE TO SURETIES THAT 
14 IF THE OBLIGEE, IN THIS CASE SALT LAKE CITY, PAYS TOO MUCH 
15 TO THE CONTRACTOR, BASED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK IN 
16 PLACE AT THE TIME THAT THE SURETY MAY BE DISCHARGED PRO 
17 TANTO TO THE EXTENT OF THAT OVERPAYMENT. 
18 Q OKAY. SO THE CLAIM THAT THE SURETY HAD WAS THAT 
19 SALT LAKE HAD PAID TOO MUCH, BUT JAMES WAS TAKING THE 
20 POSITION SALT LAKE HADN'T PAID ENOUGH. 
21 A YEAH. JAMES HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THEY HAD 
22 NOT RECEIVED ADEQUATE PAYMENT UNDER THE CONTRACT. AND THEY 
23 WEREN'T VERY EXCITED ABOUT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY PRESSING 
24 THAT PARTICULAR POINT, NOT ONLY THROUGH DISCOVERY BUT IN 
25 THIS FINAL EFFORT TO REFINE THOSE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
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1 DENTLY. 
2 A IT HAD BEEN A DEFENSE ALL ALONG AND WE WANTED 
3 TO MAKE A FINAL PUSH TO DRAW THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 
4 SURETY AND THE PRINCIPAL. 
5 Q OKAY. AND YOU SAY "WE." WAS EVERYONE AT THAT 
6 MEETING PRETTY WELL AGREED THAT'S WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
7 A YES. 
8 Q AND THAT SHOULD BE DONE BY THE SURETY? 
9 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
10 Q SO DO THESE NEXT TWO BIG BAR GRAPH LINES THAT 
11 I SEE RELATE TO PUSHING THAT MOTION IN SOME WAY? 
12 A TO THAT AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL MATTERS THAT WERE 
13 ALSO PENDING AT THE TIME. 
14 Q I GUESS THE TRIAL WAS KIND OF HEATING UP. WE'RE 
15 GETTING READY FOR TRIAL AT THIS POINT? 
16 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
17 Q SO THERE IS TRIAL PREPARATION AND THEN INDEPENDENT 
18 DEFENSES, RIGHT? 
19 A RIGHT. 
20 Q OKAY. NOW, I WANTED TO ASK YOU. YOU SAY YOU 
21 GOT INVOLVED SOME TIME IN THIS AREA, THE '80, '78 AREA AT 
22 THE BEGINNING. 
23 A RIGHT. 
24 Q THEN SHORTLY AFTER THAT THE STIPULATION WAS 
25 SIGNED. 
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1 Q SO THAT'S—WE'RE TALKING AFTER THESE MOTIONS 
2 HAVE BEEN ARGUED AND WHILE PRE-TRIAL IS STILL HEATING UP 
3 A LITTLE BIT. 
4 A RIGHT. 
5 Q HOW DID YOU HAPPEN TO TALK TO MR. ANDERSON? 
6 A I WAS ON THE WAY TO THE BANK AT VALLEY BANK AND 
7 I RAN INTO HIM OUTSIDE THE VALLEY TOWERS WHERE HIS OFFICE 
8 WAS, I BELIEVE, AT THE TIME. 
9 Q WAS ANYONE PRESENT BESIDES YOU AND MR. ANDERSON? 
10 A SEVERAL PEOPLE WALKED BY BUT WE WERE THE ONLY 
11 PARTIES TO THE CONVERSATION. 
12 Q TELL ME ABOUT THE CONVERSATION. WHAT DID YOU 
13 SAY AND WHAT DID HE SAY? 
14 A MAY I RELY ON MY MEMORY? 
15 Q CERTAINLY. 
16 A I HAPPENED TO ASK BOB--WE WERE CONTINUALLY INTER-
17 ESTED IN THE STATUS OF SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS AND POTENTIAL 
18 RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN JAMES/HOOD AND SALT LAKE 
19 CITY, AND I OPENED THE CONVERSATION WITH MR. ANDERSON BY 
20 ASKING HIM WHAT THE STATUS OF THAT WAS, IF HE SAW ANY BREAKS 
21 IN THE IMPASSE. HE INDICATED HE DIDN'T. AND IT WAS AT 
22 THAT TIME MR. ANDERSON SAID THAT WE PROBABLY OUGHT TO CONSI-
23 DER, I'M NOT EVEN SURE HE DISCUSSED IT WITH HIS OWN CLIENT, 
24 AND I CERTAINLY HAD NOT WITH INDUSTRIAL, BUT WE OUGHT TO 
25 CONSIDER, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE CASE AS IT EXISTED AS 
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SHOES AS JAMES CONSTRUCTORS EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT OF OUR, 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S, BOND CAP. 
Q I SEE. SO YOUR CASE STOOD ON JAMES' CASE AND 
YOU WON OR LOST WHETHER 
EXTENT OF THE BOND. 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
JAMES WON OR LOST, AT LEAST TO THE 
» I 
Q AND SO DID YOU FEEL THEN THAT IT WOULD NOT 
JEOPARDIZE INDUSTRIAL'S 
OVER THE DEFENSE? 
POSITION TO ALLOW JAMES TO TAKE 
A BASED ULTIMATELY ON INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S j 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUGGESTION AND THEIR RENEWED REVIEW OF 
HOOD'S FINANCIAL STATEMENT THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. NOW, ' 
SHOW YOU AN EXHIBIT-
MR. DANIELS: 
JUDGE YOUNG: 
MR. DANIELS: 
JUDGE YOUNG: 
MR. ANDERSON 
JUDGE YOUNG: 
MR. DANIELS: 
THIS TOOK PLACE IN MAY. I WANT TO | 
WAS 19 RECEIVED, YOUR HONOR? | 
NO. 
WE'D OFFER IT. i 
19 IS OFFERED. ANY OBJECTION TO 19? 
: NO OBJECTION. 
19-P IS RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 19 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
THANK YOU. 
Q (BY MR. DANIELS) I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU WHAT'S j 
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JKED EXHIBIT 20, ASK 
11 2ND. 
OKAY. 
0 NOW, DID YOU WR 
I DID. 
WHAT GENERALLY WAS THE PURPOSE 0,
 n,vi,i„« 
A THE PURPOSE OF THE LETTER WAS TO CONFIRM THAT 
IAL INDEMNITY WOULD, IN FACT, TENDER THE DEFENSE 
DOSES OF TRIAL TO HOOD AND TO ITS ATTORNEY. AND 
III. W/.NIIM 10 CLEAR THAI. Ill MUMi- SO WE WERE ALSO WAIVING 
MI | nn-irp i K|nr pr^|D| NT |iirrt\i'[ Mih THAT HOOD HAD NO OBJECT I Oljl 
10 III I M MI i mi Ml MMAll. PURPOSE OF THE LETTER WAS TO 
HAVE SOMEONE ON BEHALF OF HOOD FORMALLY ACCEPT THE TENDER 
UNDER THOSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 
Q AND THERE WAS A BIT ( " T' u r Tue<?'F
 P C T W C F N M A Y 
17 AND AUGUST 2ND. WHAT TOOK SO LONG? 
A MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT WE HAD SOME Dl 
IH I OBTAINING FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED FROM HOOD. 
20 Q SO YOU HAD TO CHECK WITH CLIENT AND THEN 
21 YOII HAH llll CHECK THE FINANCIAL', fl 
22 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
23 Q nh AY . ANI» 1HFN I'd Mill H'MI,, ||iW |. 0N( II WAS FROF' 
2 «,| |.|| ||h I I II I I I HIM | | | | in MI 1.1 I-' II I I i IUUD?j 
25 A Mi II C OL I E-(' I I (IN II WAS M O M Id / MONIII. 
A-(. • n '-A ^ 
1 I JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. CROSS-EXAMINATION? 
2 I MR. DANIELS: JUST ONE OR TWO. 
3 
4
 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
5
 BY MR. DANIELS: 
6 Q WOODY, DID YOU EVER SUGGEST TO SLAUGHTER OR MAX 
7 OR ANYONE AT SNOW, CHRISTENSEN £ MARTINEAU THAT THEY WERE 
8 SPENDING TOO MUCH TIME OR THEIR INVOLVEMENT WAS TOO GREAT 
9 IN THE CASE, THEY OUGHT TO CUT BACK THEIR INVOLVEMENT? 
10 A NO, I DID NOT. THAT WAS NOT MY PREROGATIVE TO 
11 MAKE. 
12 Q AND YOU WERE TRYING TO COOPERATE WITH SNOW, 
13 CHRISTENSEN £ MARTINEAU LAWYERS IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS; 
14 ISN'T THAT RIGHT? 
15 A TO THE EXTENT COOPERATION WAS POSSIBLE, CERTAINLY 
16 Q TO THE EXTENT THAT YOUR CLIENTS DIDN'T HAVE CON-
17 FLICTING INTERESTS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
18 A THAT IS CORRECT. 
19 Q AND THEY SEEMED TO BE DOING THE SAME. 
20 A AS FAR AS I COULD TELL. 
21 MR. DANIELS: THANK YOU. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. ANYTHING FURTHER? 
23 MR. ANDERSON: NOTHING FURTHER. 
24 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. POWELL. YOU MAY 
25 J BE EXCUSED. YOU MAY STEP DOWN. 
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THAT MATTER WAS THROWN BACK TO THE TRIAL COURT BY THE SUPREME 
COURT FINDING A FACTUAL ISSUE EXISTED. BUT IF YOU MAKE 
THAT ASSUMPTION I AGREE WITH YOU. 
Q SO IF THE SALT LAKE CITY ALTER EGO THEORY DIDN'T 
FLY IT WOULD BENEFIT HOOD FOR THE SURETY TO MAKE ITS OWN 
DEFENSES WORK. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q ONE OTHER THING. NOW WHEN MR. BROWN RE-TENDERED 
THE DEFENSE IN EXHIBIT 10--DO YOU HAVE IT THERE IN FRONT 
OF YOU? 
A I PROBALY DO. YES. 
Q DID YOU READ THAT PART WHERE HE SAYS THAT WOODY 
POWELL'S ONLY GOING TO BE DEFENDING THE PROPERTY DAMAGE 
CLAIMS? 
A I DID READ THAT. 
Q OKAY. BUT YOU TALKED TO WOODY AND COME TO THE 
CONCLUSION THAT HE, HIS DEFENSE, WAS MUCH BROADER THAN THAT 
A THAT'S CORRECT. AND ALSO NOT LOOKING AT THE 
FILE IT APPEARS IT'S MUCH BROADER THAN THAT. YOU ALSO HAVE 
TO KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM HERE. 
BASICALLY, WHAT THE CLAIM WAS IS THAT THEY WERE IMPROPER 
MATERIALS AND IMPROPER METHODS OF COMPACTION AND THAT THAT, 
THOSE METHODS, AND THOSE MATERIALS, CAUSED SUBSIDENCE AND 
INJURY TO THE PIPE AND ALSO CAUSED ASSOCIATED PROPERTY DAMAG 
Q RIGHT. 
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1 INTERESTS OF THE SURETY? 
2 A I AGREE WITH THAT. 
3 MR. DANIELS: THANK YOU. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, 
4 YOUR HONOR. 
5 MR. ANDERSON: NOTHING FURTHER AND WE REST, YOUR 
6 HONOR. 
7 I JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. ARGUMENT? 
MR. DANIELS: GO FIRST? 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
MR. DANIELS: I WILL BE VERY BRIEF. JUDGE, YOU'V| 
11
 I BEEN INVOLVED WITH THIS CASE A LOT LONGER THAN I HAVE AND 
1 2
 I KNOW A LOT MORE ABOUT IT. I'M NOT GOING TO HAVE TOO MUCH 
TO SAY HERE. 
1 4
 I I ONLY THINK THE LAW IN THIS AREA IS VERY MUCH 
1 5
 IN DISPUTE. YOU KNOW, MR. ANDERSON WAS READING TO MR. NORTON 
1 6
 FROM A CASE AND SAID HOW WE HAVE TO PROVE THAT OUR FEES 
1 7
 I ARE REASONABLE, NECESSARY AND SO ON. AND THAT'S--I DON'T 
DISPUTE THAT. YOU KNOW, I COULD FIND SOME CASES THAT COME 
1 9
 I TO THE SAME CONCLUSION BY, YOU KNOW, LANGUAGE THAT KIND 
2 0
 | OF EMPHASIZES THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT, BUT THE LAW'S REALLY 
PRETTY CLEAR. 
22 I
 B A C K IN THE EARLY PART OF THE CENTURY THERE IS 
2 3
 | A CASE NAMED HIDDLE THAT WAS DECIDED. AND BACK THEN THE 
I 
2 4
 I COURTS FOLLOWD THE HIDDLE COURT, THE HIDDLE COURT RULE THAT 
2 5
 YOU REALLY GOT TO SHOW IF YOU DON'T WMNT TO PAY THE WHOLE 
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1 ATTORNEY'S FEES IS BAD FAITH. THE SURETY IS ENTITLED TO 
2 GO OUT AND DO WHAT THEY HAVE TO DO TO DEFEND THEMSELF. 
3 AND THE ONLY WAY THAT THEY WON'T BE FULLY REIMBURSED IF 
4 IT'S BAD FAITH, THAT IS, IT'S NOT A BLANK CHECK, WE CAN'T 
5 JUST GO OUT AND RUN UP ANY BILL WE WANT AND SAY DON'T WORRY 
6 ABOUT IT BECAUSE SOMEBODY HAS TO PAY. THAT HIDDLE CASE 
7 HAS SOMEWHAT ERODED SOME OVER THE CENTURY. THE SURETY NOT 
8 ONLY HAVE TO SHOW THEY DIDN'T HAVE BAD FAITH BUT ALSO THEY 
9 WERE REASONABLE AND NECESSARY. 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T THINK ANYBODY IN THIS CASE 
11
 IS DISPUTING THE REASONABLE ASPECT OF--
12 MR. DANIELS: THAT'S RIGHT. 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: SO IT REALLY COMES, AS MR. MARIGER 
14 SAID, WHETHER IT'S NECESSARY AND, THUS, UNREASONABLE. SO 
15
 IF IT BEGINS OUT AS ALL BEING REASONABLE THEN THE PRONG 
16
 THAT I THINK THAT MR. ANDERSON IS CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO 
17 PREVAIL ON IS THAT IT, IN FACT, WASN'T NECESSARY. 
18 MR. DANIELS: ONLY IN THAT, REALLY ONLY TWO PARTS[ 
19
 I ONE WAS THIS SITUATION BACK WHEN THEY TENDERED, THEY RE-
TENDERED THE DEFENSE, MR. BROWN RE-TENDERED THE DEFENSE. 
BUT THE POINT I WANT TO MAKE IS THAT IT'S NOT A QUESTION 
2 2
 I OF LOOKING BACK WITH HINDSIGHT AND SAYING WHAT WOULD HAVE 
2 3
 BEEN THE BEST THING TO DO LOOKING BACK. THEY'RE NOT ENTITLE^) 
2 4
 I TO COME HERE LIKE MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKS AND SAY, WELL, 
YOU KNOW, THIS WASN'T REALLY NECESSARY. THEY HAVE TO PUT 
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1 YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO AWARD INTEREST. NOT SO. VERY PRIME 
2 CASE ON THAT ISSUE, YOUR HONOR, IS PARENTS AGAINST DRUNK 
3 DRIVERS V. GREYSTONE CLIENTS, WHICH IS A 1990 UTAH COURT 
4 OF APPEALS DECISION. AND THAT CASE IS CITED EXTENSIVELY 
5 IN OUR BRIEFS. IN THIS MATTER AND IN THAT CASE BOB DE BRY 
6 ASSIGNED HIS CLAIM FOR FEES OVER TO PARENTS AGAINST DRUNK 
7 DRIVERS BUT HE HAD A CLAIM THAT SAID HE HAD ABSOLUTE RIGHT 
8 TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CASE SHOULD BE SETTLED. NOW THE 
9 COURT THREW THAT OUT AND SAID THAT'S CONTRARY TO PUBLIC 
10 POLICY. BUT THEY SAID, OKAY, SO YOU GOT A CONTRACT THAT 
11 YOU GET 30 PERCENT BUT WE'RE THROWING THAT OUT BECAUSE OF 
12 THIS INVALID PROVISION. WELL, IF YOU DON'T HAVE A FIXED 
13 AND DETERMINABLE AMOUNT, IF YOU DON'T HAVE A LIQUIDATED 
14 AMOUNT, INTEREST DOESN'T APPLY. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: HOW--
16 MR. ANDERSON: AND THE VERY STIPULATION HERE, 
17 YOUR HONOR, PROVIDES THAT YOU'RE GOING TO DETERMINE WHAT'S 
18 REASONABLE AFTER LOOKING AT EVERYTHING AND CONSIDERING THE 
19 CONTINUUM OF THE FACT THAT SERVICES HAVE BEEN PROVIDED OVER 
20 THIS PERIOD AND IT'S NOT A LOCK STEP THING. WE DON'T PROVID 
21 INTEREST ON AMOUNTS THAT ARE DETERMINED THAT WAY UNLESS 
22 THEY'RE FIXED AND DETERMINABLE. AND THE PARENTS AGAINST 
23 DRUNK DRIVERS CASE CLEARLY PROVIDES GUIDANCE THAT INTEREST 
24 IS NOT AWARDABLE IN THIS CASE. 
25 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL NOW, WAIT A MINUTE. THAT 
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1 SEEMS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TO ME. THAT SEEMS LIKE A CONTIN-
2 GENT FEE CASE WHERE YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU'RE GOING TO 
3 GET. HERE, YOU HAVE MONTHLY STATEMENTS. IF HOOD AT ANY 
4 TIME WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE MONTHLY STATEMENTS ARE OF 
5 INDEMNITY, IF THEY CALLED UP SNOW, CHRISTENSEN OR IF THEY'D 
6 CALLED UP EVEN INDEMNITY AND SAID, LOOK, HOW MUCH EXPOSURE 
7 HAVE YOU GOT RIGHT NOW, I THINK THEY WOULD HAVE READILY 
8 BEEN GIVEN THE FEES FROM SNOW, CHRISTENSEN AT ANY TIME 
9 THROUGHOUT. THIS IS QUITE A DIFFERENT SITUATION. 
10 MR. ANDERSON: LET ME TIP IT THE OTHER WAY. 
11
 WHY DIDN'T THEY SEND US NOTICE OF IT, WHY DIDN'T THEY SEND 
12 THE BILLINGS? WE HAD NO IDEA THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE ANY-
"•3 THING OF THIS ENORMITY. WHY DO WE HAVE THE BURDEN TO GO 
1
* TO THEM AND SAY, HEY, TELL US WHAT IT IS IF THEY'RE GOING 
15
 TO BE CLAIMING IT EVENTUALLY. LET US KNOW. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: I CAN SEE WHY YOU MAY WANT TO TIP 
17
 IT THAT WAY EXCEPT THEY'RE SHOWING UP AT EVERY DEPOSITION 
18
 AND NOT SAYING ANYTHING, YOU KNOW THAT THEY'RE APPEARING 
19
 AT EVERY HEARING BEFORE THE COURT. WHEN I LOOK BACK AT 
20 J THIS HISTORY THERE'S SEVERAL COINCIDENCES THAT APPLY IN 
THIS CASE, BUT ONE OF THEM IS THAT THE MOTIONS IN LIMINE 21 
2 2
 | AND THE OTHER MOTIONS THAT BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE WERE 
2 3
 I ARGUED BEFORE JUDGE BILLINGS. I CAME ON THE BENCH IN 
2 4
 I FEBRUARY OF '87. ISN'T IT INTERESTING THAT EVERYBODY TRIED 
2 5
 TO, BY AGREEMENT, TO RE-RUN THE SAME MOTIONS WITH ME, AND 
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1 THEN I DENY THE MOTIONS? 
2 MR. ANDERSON: I WASN'T IN THE CASE THEN SO . . . 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: I KNOW. AND THE BAD THING IS THAT 
4 YOU WEREN'T AND THE BAD THING IS THAT YOU WEREN'T IN THIS 
5 CASE EARLY ON AND THAT THE CASE BY HOOD WAS JUST SIMPLY 
6 BEING IGNORED OR NEGLECTED. IT MAY GO AWAY. 
7 THERE'S ANOTHER FACTOR THAT COULD EVEN BE PLAYING 
8 INTO THIS AND EVERYONE'S SKIDDISHNESS. I THINK WE ALL KNOW 
9 THE CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE MARKET WAS SUFFERING DRAMATICALLY 
10 DURING THE MID TO LATE 1980'S. AND WHO KNOWS WHAT SIZE 
11 CONTRACTS HOOD IS INVOLVED IN. ISN'T HOOD OUT OF WHITTIER, 
12 CALIFORNIA? 
13 MR. ANDERSON: YES. 
14 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. SO HERE WE ARE IN 
15 WHITTIER, CALIFORNIA WITH HOOD, WITH 13 TO 15 MILLION DOLLARS 
16 IN THE BANK IN C.D.'S, BUT WE DON'T KNOW IF THEY'RE DOING 
17 100 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF WORK EVERY YEAR. I DON'T KNOW 
18 I HAVEN'T REVIEWED THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOR DO I FEEL 
19 IT WOULD BE MY RESPONSIBILITY TO DO THAT, BUT THEY SAY 
20 THEY'VE GOT 13 TO 15 MILLION. IF THEY ARE WORKING ON 100 
21 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF WORK EVERY YEAR, 13 TO 15 MILLION 
22 DOLLARS ISN'T A GREAT DEAL OF SECURITY. SO TO ME THIS WAS 
23 THE KIND OF THING THAT THE REAL ERRORS IN THIS, AND I'LL 
24 BE REALLY CANDID, THE REAL ERRORS IN THIS CASE WERE MADE 
25 BY HOOD. THEY WERE THE ONES WHO DIDN'T WANT TO TAKE AN 
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1 I AFFIRMATIVE, ASSERTIVE ROLE HERE, THEY SET UP THE CORPORATION) 
2 WHICH MR. MARIGER REFERRED TO AS A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY 
3 WHY WERE THEY OPERATING UNDER THE WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY 
4 IF THEY WEREN'T ATTEMPTING TO LIMIT LIABILITY IN RELATION 
5 TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOB? 
6 MR. ANDERSON: LET ME ANSWER THAT. 
7 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
8 MR. ANDERSON: THEY BOUGHT THAT COMPANY. AND 
9 IT WAS A VERNAL COMPANY THAT WAS ENGAGED IN BUSINESS IN 
10 THE OIL PIPELINE BUSINESS IN VERNAL. 
11 JUDGE YOUNG: UH-HUH. 
12 MR. ANDERSON: THEY WANTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
13 TRY THE INTEREST IN THE MARKET. HERE'S A GOING, EXISTING 
14 COMPANY, THEY GOT INTO IN VERNAL, THEY COME TO SALT LAKE, 
15 THEY BID ON A JOB IN SALT LAKE. I MEAN, THERE'S NOTHING 
16 EVIL ABOUT HAVING A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY. 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: NO, I DON'T WISH TO CAUSE YOU TO 
18 INFER THAT LITERALLY. MAYBE ONE OTHER COMMENT AND I WON'T 
19 INTERRUPT YOU EITHER. BUT THE OTHER "COINCIDENCE," QUOTE 
20 UNQUOTE, OF THIS TIME IS WE ARE IN 1983/'84 WHEN WE'RE DURINf; 
21 THE WETTEST YEAR IN UTAH HISTORY, SO WE GET DOWN INTO THIS 
^ TRENCH AND WE DEAL WITH THE COMPACTION ISSUES AND THE PIPE'S 
23
 ALL SETTLED BECAUSE OF ALL THE SUBTERRANEAN WATER OR OTHER 
24
 PROBLEMS THAT OCCUR. HOW MUCH CAN WE ATTRIBUTE TO GOD, 
25
 I DON'T KNOW, BUT THIS WHOLE THING--
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